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TOWARD A LIABILITY RULE APPROACH TO THE "ONE
SHARE, ONE VOTE" CONTROVERSY: AN EPITAPH FOR
THE SEC'S RULE 19c-4?
PETER N. FLOCOSt
While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New
England town meeting.'
INTRODUCTION
For as long as the corporation has existed as a legally recognized
entity, the problem of shareholder voting rights has existed in some
way as well.2 Like St. Elmo's Fire, though, this ever present problem
has flared up only at certain times; times that, moreover, correspond
to watershed periods of American history. The 1980s have been one
such period, a time during which the intense debate of the 1920s
over the "one share, one vote" issue3 has been re-ignited.
Until the 1920s, the American investment custom, with little
exception, was one vote for each share of a corporation's common
stock.4 By the mid-1920s, though, a trend emerged towards the use
t B.A., B.S. 1985,J.D. 1990, University of Pennsylvania.
1 TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,180 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (Allen, C.).
2 See, e.g., Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote,' 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1970) (noting that the
"problem of shareholder voting was recognized at the earliest stages of the
development of business corporations in England, 400 years ago").
s As used in this Comment, the term "one share, one vote" refers to a situation
in which all common shares of a corporation have equal voting rights. The converse
situation is "disparate voting," in which one class of common shares possesses voting
power inferior or superior to that of another class of common shares. See Voting
Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release Nos.
25,891 and 25,891A, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,247
(July 12, 1988) [hereinafter Release] (Securities and Exchange Commission stating
that "departures from the one share, one vote rule are collectively called 'disparate
voting rights plans' ").
4 See, e.g., 1 V. MORAWE'Z, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 476 (2d ed. 1886) (pointing
out that "the custom of giving the shareholders.., a vote for every share has become
so well established that it is fair to imply an intention to follow this custom in the
absence of any indication to the contrary").
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of nonvoting common stock by public companies.5 A technical sub-
ject traditionally the province of legal scholars and other intellectu-
als, nonvoting stock quick[y attracted the attention of the nation's
most powerful men and institutions. The appeals of Professor Wil-
liam Z. Ripley-a political economist at Harvard who had made the
ideal of one share, one vote a personal crusade-led President Cal-
vin Coolidge and the Congress to make "threatening noises" about
the emerging dual class capital structures.6 The Justice Department
announced an inquiry into the matter as well,7 and the entire issue
could be read about on the front page of the New York Times.
8
Because of this maelstrom, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
announced in January, 1926 that as a general matter, it would no
longer list disparate voting common shares.9 The historic NYSE one
share, one vote listing rule remained undisturbed for nearly sixty
years.
In many ways, the 1980s proved a replay of the 1920s. Once
again, an economic trend toward dual class recapitalizations
emerged.' 0 In 1984, the NYSE announced that it was putting a mor-
atorium on enforcement of its longstanding general rule of one
share, one vote pending further investigation of the rule. Subse-
quently, amidst a media fanfare reminiscent of the 1920s, the NYSE's
directors in July, 1986 approved a resolution allowing the listing of
securities created in a dual class transaction provided that the trans-
5 See Stevens, Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.
J. ECON. 353, 355 (1926).
When a company goes public with a disparate voting capital structure, it is said
to have undergone a "dual class capitalization." A "recapitalization," however, is a
material readjustment in the rights of a corporation's existing capital stock. See W.
CAREY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-TONS 1268 (6th ed.
1988). Hence, when a public company reclassifies its single class of common stock
into two new classes with disparate voting rights, the firm is said to have undergone a
"dual class recapitalization."
6 See Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to Professor Gilson, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1989).
7 See Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share,
One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASFi. L. REV. 687, 695-96 (1986).
8 See President Studies Non-Voting Stocks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1926, at 1, col. 5.
9 See Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 982.
10 Of the 44 public companies that created a dual class capital structure between
1962 and 1984, for instance, 37 of them--or 84%-did so betweenJanuary 1980 and
January 1985. See Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and
Shareholder Wealth, 18J. FIN. EcoN. 313, 314-15 (1987). These firms were for the
most part traded on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and over-the-counter
(OTC) markets, that had no one share, one vote policy comparable to that of the
NYSE. See infra note 150 for a discussion of the structure of modem
recapitalizations.
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action was approved by a majority of the company's independent
directors and publicly held outside shares. 1 Once again, as in the
1920s, threatening noises emanated from Washington.' 2 A number
of bills, all of them hostile to the Exchange's revisionism, sprang up
in Congress soon thereafter.' 3 For the second time this century,
scholarly commentary critical of the NYSE's actions and calling for
restrictions upon dual class capital structures appeared.14  The
Securities and Exchange Commission-a creature of the New Deal
era that did not exist during the previous imbroglio over the one
share, one vote issue-stepped into the breach inJuly, 1988 with the
promulgation of Rule 19c-4. 5
In essence, Rule 19c-4 sought to mandate a general one share,
one vote rule for America's publicly traded companies and to ban,
with few exceptions, dual class recapitalization transactions. Such
goals are clearly evidenced by the formidable "effects test" forming
the basis of the SEC's rule:
No rule, stated policy, practice, or interpretation of [an] exchange
shall permit the listing, or the continuance of listing, of any com-
mon stock or other equity security of a domestic issuer, if the issuer
of such security issues any class of security, or takes other corpo-
rate action, with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately
11 See 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 998 (1986); Big Board Ends Equal Voting Rule,
N.Y. Times,July 4, 1986, at D1, col. 1. The NYSE resolution brought the Exchange's
listing policy substantially into line with state corporate law standards. The general
state law rule has been to permit the creation of disparate voting common stock
classes, but to make the matter a mandatory subject of the articles of incorporation.
See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS § 124, at 290 (3d ed. 1983).
Hence, under state law, recapitalizations are permitted provided they are approved
by a majority of the firm's directors and shares. The NYSE resolution simply
strengthened this approach, requiring majority approval by the firm's independent
directors and outside shares.
12 See Sommer, Three Takeover Reform Bills Pending in Congress, NAT'L LJ., May 23,
1988, at 25 (reporting that "[allmost immediately, this proposal [the NYSE
resolution] elicited negative responses on Capitol Hill").
1s See id at 24-27; id., June 27, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
14 See, e.g., Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CALF. L. REv. 1 (1988). The original work embodying the
conventional outlook on shareholder voting rights as it originated in the 1920s is
Professor Ripley's classic Main Street and Wall Street. See W. RiPLEY, MAIN SrREET AND
WALL STRE r (1927).
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1989). Rule 19c-4 was promulgated by the SEC under
Section 19(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which empowers the
Commission to "abrogate, add to and delete from" the rules of exchanges or
associations within the jurisdiction of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
Accompanying adoption of Rule 19c-4 by the SEC was a written Release, in which the
Commission's position with respect to Rule 19c-4 is elaborated. See Release, supra
note 3.
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reducing the per share voting rights of holders of an outstanding
class or classes of common stock of such issuer registered pursuant
to Section 12 of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 1934].16
Although neither the SEC nor any other commentator so char-
acterized it, a one share, one vote rule such as Rule 19c-4 protects a
shareholder's right to vote with a general "inalienability rule" in the
lexicon of the now famous Calabresi and Melamed framework.
1 7
Even if shareholders knowingly and willingly desire a change in the
corporation's voting structure, such a transaction would not be per-
mitted. This Comment undertakes to examine critically the mindset
and reasoning behind legalily mandated shareholder voting equality,
and to put forward an alternative model of regulation for dual class
recapitalization transactions, using the SEC's Rule 19c-4 as a spring-
board for the analysis. This Comment argues that the formal con-
ventional rationales underpinning a one share, one vote rule such as
Rule 19c-4 are unsatisfying; and that the persuasive reasons that do
exist for regulation of dual. class capital structures point to a policy
prescription significantly different than the inalienability rule
approach favored by the SEC and other one share, one vote
advocates.
Although Rule 19c-4 itself has been set aside recently on admin-
istrative law grounds by the District of Columbia Circuit, 8 several
factors strongly suggest the continuing relevance of this Comment's
undertaking. First, it is unlikely that the underlying controversy over
the wisdom of a one share, one vote rule is dead or moot-even if the
D.C. Circuit's ruling stands. 9 The SEC, for its part, has hardly lost
16 17 C.F.R § 240.19c-4(a) (1989) (emphasis added). An identical test appears
in Rule 19c-4 for any "association." See id. § 240.19c-4(b). Hence, Rule 19c-4 by its
terms covered not only the NYSE but also the AMEX, the OTC markets, and most
regional markets as well.
17 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HAav. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In this seminal work, Calabresi
and Melamded develop a framework for analyzing legal disputes-essentially pollution
and nuisance problems-in which one party engages in activity imposing damages on
another. The right to engage in that activity is an "entitlement," as is the right to be
free from that activity. See id. at 1090. "Inalienability rule" protection means that the
entitlement cannot be taken away from the owner even if he consents to it. See id. at
1092-93. "Liability rule" protection means that the entitlement can be taken away
from the owner even without his voluntary consent, but the person so doing will have
to pay the owner an objectively determined value for the entitlement. See id
18 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,291, at 96,339 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 1990) (holding that Rule 19c-4 "is in
excess of the Commission's authority under § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934").
19 As of this writing, the Commission's official position is one of "reviewing the
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enthusiasm for the substantive principles behind Rule 19c-4 and the
one share, one vote ideal.2" The sentiment in Congress, moreover,
for a statutory rule of one share, one vote has been remarkable.
21
Indeed, the issue of shareholder voting rights has remained a bone
of contention among policy makers and commentators for literally
centuries,22 and a single administrative law ruling probably will not
change 400 years of history. Even absent congressional action, it
may be possible for the SEC still to realize the goals of Rule 19c-4 by
grounding a one share, one vote rule in Exchange Act provisions
other than § 19-a possibility to which the D.C. Circuit alluded in its
opinion.2 1 While the court could neither address nor supply ratio-
nales not invoked by the Commission itself in the litigation, some
commentators indeed have argued that the SEC retains ample statu-
tory authority elsewhere upon which to base a one share, one vote
rule.24 Taken together, these observations suggest that while the
body of Rule 19c-4 may be dead, its soul is likely to linger on among
the living.
Second, the philosophy and reasoning behind Rule 19c-4 typify
the "state of the art" in a longrunning scholarly advocacy of a one
share, one vote rule. Having become the leading spokesman for the
shareholder egalitarian movement and the most influential propaga-
tor of that movement's views, the SEC presents itself as the most
appropriate object of any critical inquiry. The Commission's views
decision to determine our further course of action." Hinden, Appeals Court Upsets 1-
Share, 1-Vote Rule, Wash. Post, June 13, 1990, at B4, col. I (statement of John D.
Heine, SEC spokesman).
The deadline for requesting a rehearing en banc by the D.C. Circuit has passed,
although the Commission could of course appeal the case directly to the Supreme
Court.
20 At a press conference following the D.C. Circuits's ruling, Richard Ketchum,
director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, expressed the hope that the
stock exchanges themselves would "step up" and adopt a one share, one vote rule as
a private listing standard. See Court Finds SEC Exceeded Authority in Adopting One-Share!
One-Vote Rule, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 895, 896 (June 15, 1990). Presumably,
the Commission would not be disappointed if such a listing standard were to take the
same form as Rule 19c-4.
21 See supra notes 6 & 12-13 and accompanying text. Most prominent among the
recently proposed one share, one vote bills are S. 1314 and H.R. 2783, sponsored
respectively by Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Representative John Dingell-both
influential figures in Congress.
22 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH), 95,291, at 96,346 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 1990).
24 See, eg., Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities" SEC Regulation of
Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 809, 826-27, 830 (1987) (pointing to § 14(d)-(e) of
the Exchange Act, added in 1968 and commonly referred to as the Williams Act).
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on securities regulation are naturally sought out by and surely influ-
ence other national policy makers. It is therefore likely that both the
form of and the arguments justifying Rule 19c-4 would play a promi-
nent role in any future debate over a one share, one vote rule.
Third, what this Comment argues to be the true basis behind
one share, one vote efforts such as Rule 19c-4-an inappropriate
moral-political view of the corporation and its shareholders-is a
philosophy with implications going beyond the issue of shareholder
voting rights. Because this view colors so much of the SEC's regula-
tory approach in general, a dissection of Rule 19c-4-and an inquiry
into alternative regulatory philosophies-provides insights helpful in
evaluating the wisdom of the Commission's efforts elsewhere within
its regulatory portfolio.
While in one sense perhaps an epitaph for a particular regula-
tion that once was, this Comment more importantly provides a lens
with which to peer into, a basis from which to evaluate, and an alter-
native to a future that at some point is likely to attempt a replay of
the past.
Part I contends that the formal utilitarian justifications for a one
share, one vote regulation such as Rule 19c-4 are exaggerated rela-
tive to the severity of the regulation prescribed. Ironically, some of
the problems critics decry in the adoption by shareholders of dual
class stock plans are the result of the SEC's own policies in other
areas. Part II maintains that the actual-though unacknowledged-
underpinning of Rule 19c-4 is to be found in the Commission's his-
torical insistence upon importing essentially moral-political ideas
into corporate economic affairs, an unspoken and unidentified phi-
losophy to be found underneath the formal arguments of other one
share, one vote advocates as well. This Comment argues that the
moral-political view of the corporation and its shareholders is funda-
mentally misguided and has obfuscated the legitimate reasons that
do exist for government involvement in disparate voting rights trans-
actions. An almost mystical, New England town meeting view of cor-
porate affairs simply has sent the Commission and its supporters
down the wrong regulatory path. Part II concludes that the inevita-
ble outcome of such a march of folly is intrusive inalienability regula-
tion containing no conceptual limiting principle and disallowing
virtually all dual class recapitalizations, even though there are good
theoretical, historical, and empirical reasons to believe that such
transactions are frequently legitimate and wealth enhancing.
A more appropriate conceptual device with which to examine
dual class recapitalizations is that of the articles of incorporation as a
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type of contract that may be modified profitably by the involved par-
ties with respect to voting rights in the corporation. The con-
tractarian view has been prevalent for decades in state decisional and
statutory law, at least until Rule 19c-4 effectively nullified such a con-
struction of the corporate charter. Part III develops an alternative
regulatory model for dual class transactions based on this con-
tractarian approach. The Calabresi and Melamed concept of liability
rule protection is taken from its usual residence in property and tort
law and wed to the corporate law concept of dissenter appraisal
rights.2" Regulation of dual class transactions based on this more
narrowly tailored model likely would result in greater efficiency and
philosophical coherence than an inalienability rule approach, and
would be less intrusive into the spirit, if not the letter, of state law.
Further, the model would alleviate the formal concerns voiced by the
SEC and other one share, one vote advocates in justifying regulation
such as Rule 19c-4, even assuming such concerns to be valid as
stated.
I. THE OVERSTATED FORMAL CASE FOR A ONE SHARE,
ONE VOTE RULE
Three basic utilitarian claims constitute the SEC's formal justifi-
cation for Rule 19c-4 and exemplify those made by other one share,
one vote advocates: (1) the presence of coercive collective action
and strategic choice problems that prevent true shareholder wishes
from being realized in the proxy vote on a recapitalization plan; (2)
the belief that dual class capital structures create unacceptably large
agency cost problems; and (3) the belief that recapitalizations are
not subject to state law fiduciary duty inquiries by the courts. A gen-
eral ban on dual class recapitalizations has been seen as appropriate
under such circumstances, despite the SEC's acknowledgement of
the "difficult and complex" issues involved.26
Without a doubt, there is some truth in these claims; and depend-
25 Dissenter appraisal rights, despite variations in each state, essentially permit a
shareholder to "opt out" of certain fundamental corporate transactions with which
he disagrees and withdraw from the corporation. The corporation-that is, the
shareholders left over-must then purchase the dissenter's shares at a court
determined price reflecting the firm's pre-transaction value. See H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 11, § 349, at 997-98.
26 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,215. The empirical evidence on the wealth
effects of recapitalization plans is discussed infra notes 199-204 and accompanying
text. The SEC did not believe that such evidence was "critical" to the conclusions
underlying Rule 19c-4. See Release, supra note 3, at 89,217.
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ing upon which specific recapitalizations one chooses to focus, more
than just some truth. Particularly with reference to the mid-1980s, it
is certain that some disparate voting rights plans have been pro-
posed by management with dubious intent, adopted by the corpora-
tion in suspect circumstances, and the cause of mischief within that
corporation thereafter. In advocating what amounts to a general ban
on dual class recapitalizations, though, the SEC and its supporters
necessarily set for themselves a very different, albeit unacknowl-
edged, challenge. For a flat ban to be most sensible, these problems
must have been pervasive in such transactions, or systematically pres-
ent, over the years. Accumulated knowledge ought to suggest that
there is no other possible solution. The historical evidence indicates
that this challenge cannot be met satisfactorily. Much of the conven-
tional reasoning backing a one share, one vote rule is inflated rela-
tive to the broad scope of 'Rule 19c-4, and still other components of
the conventional argument, are based upon problems the SEC itself
has helped to create.
A. Collective Action and Strategic Choice Problems
1. Collective Action Problems
According to the SEC and other commentators, coercive collec-
tive action problems make shareholder defeat of a recapitalization
proposal generally unlikely, even though it is the wish of sharehold-
ers to do so. One such problem said to plague shareholders is the
"freerider" problem, a theory that turns on the absence of a compul-
sory cost-sharing mechanism among shareholders in a dual class
transaction.
2 7
However, freerider problems of the theoretical magnitude sup-
posed by the SEC do not exist in the recapitalization proxy vote;
unlike the circumstances usually exemplifying the freerider problem,
a basic compulsory cost sharing mechanism does exist. Nuisance and
pollution cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 8 for example,
demonstrate classic freerider economics. There, neighborhood resi-
27 Freerider problems are said to explain why a shareholder who feels that a
proposal is not in his best interest will still not organize an opposition. See Release,
supra note 3, at 89,216 n.73. While the shareholder may gain from opposing the
transaction, he will gain even more if other shareholders bear the cost of doing so.
Since no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists, according to the Commission
and its supporters, insufficient incentive exists to organize an opposition, and the
individual will simply "freeride" on the efforts of others. See id.; Gordon, supra note
14, at 44.
28 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
1990]
dents were plagued by dirt, smoke, and vibrations emanating from a
nearby cement factory. The severity of the freerider collective action
problem was obvious: somebody had to go out and sue the firm in
order to stop the pollution. Those who did alone bore the full costs
of opposition; if the injunction then traditional under New York law
in such situations had been granted, public freeriders who did not
join as plaintiffs in the suit would still have reaped the benefits of
that suit.
2 9
Yet consider the identical situation in the context of a proxy vote
on a management proposal that might, say, "pollute" the share-
holder "residents" of the corporation. No suit would be needed.
Each such "resident" would receive a ballot allowing him to vote on
the question of stopping the pollution, or on whether he would
accept some specified amount of money in order to allow the pollu-
tion. The usual collective action problem would be reduced pre-
cisely because a collective action mechanism is built into the proxy
voting process itself" ° Nor is this fact particularly surprising. In
recognition of the potential effectiveness of the proxy process as a
collective action mechanism, one major goal of Congress in the
Exchange Act appears dearly to have been maintaining the integrity
of and strengthening the proxy process precisely in order to allow
dispersed shareholders more effectively to control corporate
action."1 The result of that voting process can hardly be explained
away, as the Commission seems to do, by whispering the phrase
"freerider problems" and professing satisfaction that the share-
holder recapitalization vote has been discredited on "collective
action" grounds.
32
29 See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 222-23, 226, 257 N.E.2d at 871-73, 309 N.Y.S.2d at
314-17 (recognizing this in ordering damages for plaintiffs rather than injunctive
relief; while the nuisance might have adverse consequences for many parties, only the
plaintiffs sought relief, and they would be fully redressed by the damages judgment).
30 Basic corporations texts teach that the proxy voting process serves to check
potential freerider problems in collective shareholder action by collectivizing the
costs of monitoring management and shifting them to the corporation. See J.
CHOPER, J. COFFEE, JR. & C.R. MORRIS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
549 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafterJ. CHOPER].
31 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934); see also S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1934);
Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on
Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 226, 227-28 (1940).
32 The Commission's discussion in the Release of both freerider and rational
apathy, collective action problems constitutes one paragraph and footnote; a
remarkably small proportion of the 27 page document, and disappointing given the
SEC's heavy reliance on these factors as the basis for its important regulation. See
Release, supra note 3, at 89,216 & n.73.
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Of course, truly organized opposition to a corporate proposal
means more than the simple existence of a basic cost sharing mecha-
nism in the proxy vote. Although it says nothing on the subject in
the Release, the SEC might also have had in mind other aspects of
freerider problems involved in organized opposition to manage-
ment. As Professor Gordon has written, these problems involve the
great expense of communication and coordinated action among dis-
persed public shareholders. 31 It is difficult, however, to be moved by
such a justification for a one share, one vote rule because the SEC is
itself an important cause of this problem.
Under the Commission's Rule 14a-2(b)(1), most of the SEC's
solicitation of proxy rules would apply to any shareholder wishing to
contact more than ten other shareholders concerning the recapitali-
zation proxy vote.3 4 These proxy rules in turn impose upon the
putative insurgent shareholder a maze of regulatory and reporting
requirements 35 and, inevitably, the significant legal and other profes-
sional costs that are by-products of the regulatory state.36 Perhaps
the most chilling stricture of all is the SEC's Rule 14a-9, applicable
to any contact among shareholders with respect to the recapitaliza-
tion proxy vote, and which would impose liability on an insurgent
shareholder for statements later deemed materially false or mislead-
ing.3 7 Worse still, the corporation itself has standing to sue such a
shareholder on a claim involving Rule 14a-9 or, indeed, any of the
other solicitation of proxy rules.3 8 Even incorrigible optimists must
concede that these regulations would force even a wealthy share-
holder to think very hard about making a rebellious sales pitch to
fellow shareholders over the recapitalization proposal.
The types of obstacles created for shareholders by Rules 14a-
2(b)(1) and 14a-9 also seem a significant cause of the coercive "pris-
oner's dilemma" type of collective action problem to which the Com-
mission points in prohibiting the exchange offer form of
33 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 46.
34 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1989).
35 See id. § 240.14a-3 to -8, -1.0 to -13.
36 The total cost of a proxy action under these rules runs at least into the tens of
thousands of dollars. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1500 n.49 (1970).
37 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1989).
38 See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1966)
(recognizing a corporation's role in protecting "honest and conscientious" corporate
officials from "irresponsible outsiders," and holding that the corporation may seek
relief under the solicitation of proxy rules). Note that mere negligence rather than
scienter likely suffices to bring liability. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-97
(1980).
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recapitalization."9 Although the Release does not explicitly mention
the prisoner's dilemma by name, the Commission did explain and
implicitly adopt the idea in discussing why the exchange offer form
of recapitalization is banned by Rule 19c-4:
The exchange offer is coercive because those shareholders wishing
to hold the greater voting stock to defeat the plan would be taking
a substantial risk that an insufficient number of outside sharehold-
ers will do likewise and majority control will shift to insiders.
Accordingly, such shareholders may be "coerced" individually to
opt for the lower voting stock with a dividend sweetener to avoid
holding ineffective full voting stock, without any dividend
benefit.
40
Even as stated, the prisoner's dilemma strains common sense.
4 1
Most importantly, though, the theory draws whatever explanatory
power it has from the premise that any one shareholder is unable to
contact any other. The SEC's solicitation of proxy rules again seem
an important reason why shareholders are in effect held incommuni-
cado, because these rules raise the cost of communication from that
of a relatively inexpensive mailing to that of a major legal event that
might bring significant liability.
Another example of the unjustified alacrity with which the SEC
accepted coercion-based rationales in justifying its one share, one
vote rule involves institutional shareholders. In supporting its coer-
cion claims, the Commission makes reference in the Release to "tes-
timony from institutional investors describing the pressure placed on
managers of corporate pension plans during the shareholder voting
39 See Bermant, One Share/One Vote, Rule 19c-4: Regulation of Voting Rights,
INSIGHTS, Sept. 1988, at 9 n.15 (noting that the prisoner's dilemma "faced by a
shareholder in an exchange offer where collective action is impossible" is "caused
principally by the Commission's own Rule 14a-2(b)(1)"). For an explanation of the
exchange offer, see infra note 150.
40 Release, supra note 3, at 89,221.
41 Consider the Commission's precise claim in the quoted paragraph: out of
fear that enough other shareholders might behave in a manner that assures
management of control, a shareholder who fears this outcome will behave in a way
that assures management of control that much more. Whatever happened to the old-
fashioned method of voting against an undesired proposal? The SEC's use of the
prisoner's dilemma brain-teaser here to explain shareholder behavior is, with
respect, reminiscent of Tweedledee's attempt to guess what was on Alice's mind in
the woods: "Contrariwise... if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be;
but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic." L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 68 (1928). Former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr.
has wondered whether there is in fact even "a single shareholder who follows the
supposedly universally followed strategy" of the prisoner's dilemma. See Sommer,
One Share/One Vote-The SEC Stumbles, DIREcTOR'S MONTHLY, Oct. 1988, at 1, 3.
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process." 4 2 The inference easily drawn by the lay reader is that pen-
sion funds and other institutional investors were being muscled into
accepting recapitalizations they did not favor. Yet the SEC, and the
scholars supporting Rule 1.9c-4, should have known better than to
draw the same general inference. Successful institutional investor
activism in opposition to management in the 1980s,43 especially pen-
sion fund activism, is by now well documented.4 4 Additionally,
although institutional holdings in recapitalizing firms are below the
norm, these holdings greatly increased from about 11 %7 before the
NYSE moratorium to about 25% after the moratorium. 4 5 Unless
institutions actively seek to invest their funds in corporations that
will abuse them, it is unlikely that the type of coercion to which the
SEC refers is a cause for real concern.4 6
These same data also make it difficult to reconcile fully the Com-
mission's freeriding arguments with the fact that freeriding is essen-
tially a phenomenon in which small shareholders exploit large
shareholders. 47 Logically, freeriding must be less of a problem the
greater the institutional owvaership in the corporation.48 The doub-
42 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216.
43 See, e.g., The Battle for Corporate Control, FORTUNE, May 18, 1987, at 102, 103
(describing many institutional investors as "fed up with executives for mismanaging
corporate assets, fending off raiders with greenmail, and, above all, evading market
discipline with poison pills, staggered boards, and dual classes of stocks that stack
voting power in friendly hands").
44 See, e.g., M. LIPTON, J. FOGELSON, A. BROWNSTEIN & C. WASSERMAN, MERGERS
AND AcQuISrrIONS: DEVELOPMEN-rS IN TAKEOVER TECHNIQUES AND DEFENSE 103
(1988) (quoting a 1986 study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center that
found that the year's proxy season had "witnessed continued growth in the activism
of public pension funds on corporate governance questions"). One of the most
recent studies concludes that by the end of the 1980s, "a number of major
institutions became militant in demanding a heightened recognition of their role in
corporate governance," and that institutional investors have frequently been
successful at adopting or defeating resolutions over management opposition. See
Rosenbaum & Korens, Institutional Shareholder Activism and Related Proposals for
Legislative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate Governance Rules, in PROXY CONTESTS,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INITATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 623, 629-32 (K.
Eppler & T. Gilroy eds. 1990).
45 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, UPDATE-THE EFFECTS OF DUAL-CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS ON
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: INCLUDING. EVIDENCE FROM 1986 AND 1987 at Table 4 (July
16, 1987) [hereinafter OCE UPDATE].
46 See also Bermant, supra note 39, at 9 n. 15 (doubting whether such institutional
coercion exists). Institutional investor activity, for example, killed a recapitalization
plan at Seagram Co. despite the fact that at the time the Bronfman family-which
proposed the transaction--controlled 40% of the company's stock. See Hector, The
Flap Over Super-Shares, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 114, 116.
47 See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
48 SeeJ. CHOPER, supra note 30, at 549.
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ling of institutional outside holdings in recapitalizing firms after the
NYSE moratorium gives further reason to believe that freeriding
problems are not of the magnitude suggested by the SEC in justify-
ing Rule 19c-4.
The SEC also asserts in the Release the existence of "rational
apathy" collective action problems in recapitalization transactions.49
This seems another high-sounding theoretical claim of lesser practi-
cal validity. In a general sense, any given management proposal that
for some reason does deter information gathering by some individ-
ual shareholders still would not result in rational apathy with respect
to the shareholder group as a whole unless every shareholder decides
to remain uninformed.50 Institutional holdings in recapitalizing
firms are high enough to make this scenario very unlikely, and it can
be demonstrated mathematically that a typical shareholder's optimal
strategy when facing an undesired recapitalization is thus probably
not the "pure strategy" of always voting with management suggested
by Professor Gordon.
5 1
The specific content of a recapitalization proposal casts addi-
tional aspersions on the potency of the rational apathy theory. The
theory, by definition, is powerful only when the object of the propo-
sal is complex or otherwise requires some sort of professional, objec-
tive, or market analysis. Only then would the informational costs-
the $X in Professor Gordon's hypothesis-be positive in any mean-
ingful sense. Rational apathy certainly would be expected if the pro-
posal involved the sale of the corporation's sole asset, say, a
cyclotron. However, the shareholder vote that is the object of the
recapitalization proposal is an inherently personal and subjective
item. No general, recognizable "market" for corporate votes exists
49 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216 n.73. Professor Gordon, who testified
before the Commission, has described the rational apathy theory most succinctly:
[L]et us assume that the shareholder receives a wide variety of
management proposals through the proxy machinery, of which only some
may reduce shareholder welfare. The shareholder must expend a certain
sum, $X, to hire an expert to analyze the proposal or expend a
comparable amount in the foregone opportunity cost of the shareholder's
own time.... [The shareholder will probably conclude that the expected
gains are less than $X. Rational apathy follows, even where the
shareholder's vote would determine the matter.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 44 n.141. Hence, according to Professor Gordon, rational
apathy leads the shareholder always to vote with management. See id. at 43-44.
50 See Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599, 1610 (1989).
51 See id. at 1607-1610.
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in the normal sense of the word.52 Only the shareholder himself can
determine what value to place upon his voting right as an everyday
possession; and the shareholder is in fact asked to do that in a recapi-
talization proposal.53
The cyclotron, by contrast, is not used by the shareholder him-
self. Rather, it simply generates cash flows in a recognizable, dis-
crete market, cash flows on which the shareholder has a direct
residual claim. This means that the proposed cyclotron sale, unlike
the proposed recapitalization, requires an objective or "intrinsic"
valuation-a pure mathematical estimation of potential future
payoffs that the object of the proposal can be expected to provide
without consideration of resale value. 4 Because the right to vote
requires a subjective personal shareholder valuation, the $X in Pro-
fessor Gordon's analysis is probably not of the general magnitude he
suggests.
2. Strategic Choice Problems
In addition to collective action problems, perceived strategic
choice problems55 formally underpin Rule 19c-4 and figure promi-
nently in the arguments of other one share, one vote supporters. In
one variant of the theorized strategic choice problem, management
is said to play "strategic games," inserting into the proxy statement a
combination of threats and bluffs.56 This particular objection to dual
class transactions is a red herring because the Delaware courts have
held that such threats will result in the entire transaction being
voided or enjoined. Professor Gordon, for his part, perfunctorily
52 The modern general rule is that corporate votes may be alienated temporarily
for purposes of specific proxy transactions, subject to judicial scrutiny for intrinsic
fairness. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 24-25 (Del. Ch. 1982).
However, stripping the vote from the underlying equity for trading as a generalized
market commodity in and of itself is not permitted. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26J.L. & ECON. 395, 410-11 (1983).
53 See infra notes 151-90 and accompanying text.
54 See T. COPELAND &J.F. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY
340 (3d ed. 1988).
55 Strategic choice problems generally describe the evils said to arise due to
management's control of the strncture and timing of the recapitalization proxy
proposal. See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216; Gordon, supra note 14, at 47. The
"sweetener" aspect of the strategic choice problem developed by Professor Gordon
and referred to by the SEC is discussed infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
56 See Gordon, supra note 14. at 50. The language usually suggests that the
insider shareholder group values control highly and, if shareholders do not approve
the recapitalization, the insider group will not raise other equity capital needed to
pursue profitable projects, since this would dilute control. See id. at 53.
57 See Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 278 (Del. Ch. 1986);
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recognizes Lacos Land, but the case does not seem to faze his analysis.
He goes on to construct elegant game theory payoff matrices, model-
ling expected payoffs and outcomes pursuant to such threats by man-
agement, the point of which is to show that such strategic behavior
by management stacks the game against shareholders.5 s That Lacos
Land seems to demolish the foundation upon which his model is built
is something that gets lost in the high powered theorizing. More-
over, Professor Gordon's model of the hypothesized strategic behav-
ior scenario itself seems inappropriate in the specific context of a
recapitalization proposal. The model he uses is more appropriate, in
game theory lingo, for a "simultaneous move" game; but a recapital-
ization is instead merely a "sequential" game.
59
Another aspect of the strategic choice problem that the SEC
identifies in the Release arises from management's use of corporate
funds to lobby shareholders in favor of the recapitalization propo-
sal.6° This argument is another example of how the Commission's
own views-in this case, the insistence on seeing the corporation as a
miniature democracy61 -tend to hoist the SEC on its own petard. It
is well known, for instance, that incumbent members of Congress
possess a major advantage in the "frank," the mailing privilege paid
for by tax dollars that allows the incumbent to reach his constituents
as directly and as frequently as he would like. 62 The frank is a simple
fact of life in a political democracy: an elected representative must
be able to communicate regularly with his constituents and cannot
be expected to pay the costs of doing so out of his own pocket.
Nonetheless, the frank permits the incumbent, in effect, to campaign
for the next election. No doubt this is a major factor in the very high
re-election rates of congressional incumbents, as the use of corpo-
rate funds by corporate incumbents is to their high re-election and
proxy success rates. 63 The SEC is impotent to change the former
situation, but could seek to change the proxy rules "for the protec-
c. Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 10.61-62 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(enjoining a corporation's self tender for its preferred shares in part due to coercive
threats by management to delist those shares unless the preferred shareholders
tendered).
58 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 49-53 & n.166.
59 See Romano, supra note 50, at 1612 n.44; infra note 150 (describing the
structure of recapitalizations).
60 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216.
61 See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
62 See F. LuNTz, CANDIDATES, CONSULTANTS & CAMPAIGNS 36 (1988).
63 For House members, the average re-election rate from 1974 to 1986 was
93%, reaching a high of 98%. See id. at 34 (table of incumbent re-election rates).
Similarly, over the 1962 to 1984 period, corporate incumbents won a majority of
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tion of investors" in the la:ter case if it so desired. If it is true that
management systematically exploits the proxy process, how about a
rule limiting the availability to management of corporate funds for
management sponsored proposals, or even a rule forcing manage-
ment to pay some of the costs? Of course, to conceive of such an
idea would be to discard it, since to the Commission the corporation
is, after all, a democracy. So long as this is the case-so long as the
Commission insists on evaluating the corporation against the
existing norms of American political democracy-it ought not to
grumble about the inevitable results. Labelling them a "problem"
justifying SEC action in a diflerent area seems a weak analytical meth-
odology that says more about the wisdom of the SEC's own philoso-
phy of corporate democracy than it does about the legitimacy of
recapitalization transactions.
B. Agency Costs
The SEC adduces various aspects of the classic agency cost
problem64 in the Release as further support for Rule 19c-4. The
Commission's general concern appears to be that, by permanently
shifting voting control to insiders, recapitalization transactions lead
to "entrenched, inefficient corporate managements acting in their
own best interest instead of in the best interest of the company and
its shareholders."-65 The argument certainly sounds plausible. The
specter of a dictatorship of the mediocre permanently at the helm of
the means of production is enough to haunt anyone. This nightmare
may be an accurate depiction of some recapitalized firms. But is it
accurate enough to support a general ban on recapitalizations? The
historical evidence, considered together with applicable corporate
legal doctrines, suggests not. Indeed, the usual agency costs present
in modem public corporations seem conspicuous in their absence
with respect to archetypal recapitalizing firms.
Empirical studies demonstrate that, in the average recapitalizing
seats about 75% of the time. See Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of
Proxy Contests, II J. FiN. ECON. 401, 410 (1983).
64 The separation of ownership and control in large public corporations
inherently creates a host of potential agency cost problems. Management insiders
may divert the firm's cash flow away from shareholders by needlessly spending
money on extravagances, perquisites, or plain old managerial inefficiencies. This in
turn creates additional costs, also borne by shareholders, to monitor the behavior of
management. SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (Papers & Proceedings 1986) (discussing these
conflicting interests between shareholders and management).
65 Release, supra note 3, at 89,211.
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firm, the management insider group's ownership in pure equity
terms is very high, on the order of 40% or so.6" It is also known that
the insider group generally has a very high percentage of its own
personal wealth invested in the firm.6 7 The control group therefore
is highly vulnerable to the wealth effects of its own decisions; looting
or waste of corporate resources is unlikely to occur for the simple
reason that management would in large part be stealing only from
itself.68 Moreover, in the classic recapitalization, the dominant
insider group is the family or descendants of the original entrepre-
neur who started the business.69 The shifting of control to such a
group is likely to result in low agency cost risk due to the unique
social relationships among the group members.70 Each member is
tied to the firm's fortunes by blood and honor, by personal prestige
and family reputation.
These factors differentiate the control group in most recapitaliz-
ing firms from any other control group, including management
groups taking a public firm private. Whether, say, a DuPont would
be able to behave with wanton disregard and profligacy as fellow
family members within the company looked on is, intuitively, doubt-
ful. 71 Even on Dynasty or Falcon Crest, familial duty and loyalty often
66 See OCE UPDATE, supra note 45, at Table 4; Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-Class
Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 129,
141 (1988). This stands in marked contrast to the usual situation in large public
corporations, where median equity ownership of CEO's, for example, is a paltry
.257o. See Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1820, 1842 (1989).
67 See J. CHOPER, supra note 30, at 543. The family-insider group of American
Family Corporation, for example, has invested in the company about 75%o of each
individual's net worth. See AMainc~A FAMILY CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1987). f
68 This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that there is no significant
sell-off of the equity interest by the insider group after the recapitalization. See
Partch, supra note 10, at 332.
69 See T. COPELAND & J.F. WESTON, supra note 54, at 742 (noting that
"significant family involvement found in sample firms"); DeAngelo & DeAngelo,
Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of
Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 34, 63-68 (1985) (noting "substantial" family
involvement in recapitalizing firms; ownership data indicates such involvement
present in 30 of 45 firms studied); infra note 73.
70 See T. COPELAND &J.F. WESTON, supra note 54, at 742 (noting that the "social
sanctions arising out of the significant family involvement found in the sample firms"
serve to keep managerial opportunism in check); Fama & Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26J.L. & EcON. 301, 306 (1983) (stating that family control in
an organization provides advantages in disciplining and monitoring other relatives in
decisionmaking positions due to the nature of the intrafamily relationship).
71 Nor is this intuition without some evidence, albeit anecdotal. The family-
insider group of the Tasty Baking Company swiftly replaced an out-of-favor relative
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serve to restrain otherwise unsavory characters. 2 Nor are the domi-
nant family groups incompetent as managers; the available evidence
indicates quite the contrary.7 3 Recapitalizing firms on average are
characterized by positive net-of-market stock returns of 45% in the
year preceding the recapitalization. 4 Such performance is remarka-
ble, and further proof that the agency cost argument does not sup-
port a ban on recapitalization transactions. The business and
financial press reports a similar general conclusion: "At major com-
panies with two classes of stock, horror stories are rare; champions
of uniform voting rights can't cite a single example."
75
The Commission's contention that recapitalizations defeat
shareholder interests in connection with the market for corporate
control76 also seems the product of unwarranted pessimism. There
is little historical reason to believe that many of these firms are hos-
tile takeover targets to begin with. Precisely because of the favorable
general performance of the firms and their demonstrated ability to
deliver the requisite amount of wealth to the shareholders, the disci-
pline of the market for corporate control is probably as much illusion
with another relative as Chairman of the Board in a proxy fight lasting a single day.
See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 69, at 54.
72 See Dynasty (ABC television broadcast); Falcon Crest (CBS television
broadcast). But see Dallas (CBS television broadcast) (competition between J.R. and
Bobby Ewing has, at times, threatened the economic integrity of Ewing Oil).
73 The historical list of firm!; undergoing recapitalizations reads like a "Who's
Who" of dynamic American entrepreneurial families: Dow Jones & Company,
Hershey Foods Corporation, Kaufman & Broad, Inc., Ford Motor Company, The
New York Times Company, Inc., The Washington Post Company, A.C. Nielsen
Company, The J.M. Smucker Company, The Gap, Inc., Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Company,
Helene Curtis, Adolph Coors Co., DuPont, and so forth. See generally DeAngelo &
DeAngelo, supra note 69, at 65-68; Gordon, supra note 14, at 80-85 (Appendix);
Partch, supra note 10, at 334-338. DeAngelo and DeAngelo expressed particular
interest that their sample firms "are also notable for their production of familiar and
successful products." See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 69, at 34.
74 See THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THE EFFECTS OF DUAL CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS ON THE WEALTH OF
SHAREHOLDERS 32 (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter JUNE 1987 OCE STUDY]. If the data
sample is narrowed to firms recapitalizing after the NYSE moratorium, this figure
drops to 26.5%, a smaller but still "strongly positive" measurement of superior
performance. See OCE UPDATE, Supra note 45, at 2.
75 Hector, supra note 46, at 116.
76 The SEC appeared persuaded by the argument that ownership of supervoting
shares by corporate insiders could defeat the function of the takeover market as a
disciplinary mechanism against bad management. See Release, supra note 3, at
89,211. Further, the Commission seemed to accept the assertion that
recapitalizations deprive shareholders of the opportunity to share in any control
premium in connection with the sale of the company; to the extent that insiders held
the voting shares they, and not the public shareholders, would receive the control
premium paid therein. See id.
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as reality for many such firms. 7 7 Further, courts have proven them-
selves perfectly capable of blocking the use of supervoting stock as
an unseemly defensive tactic in the face of a hostile takeover. 78 Dual
class recapitalizations attempted at such a time might also trigger the
extremely enhanced scrutiny of Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings.79 After all, courts have found that other types of recapitaliza-
tions changing control of the firm in the face of an imminent
takeover threat merit examination under the Revlon standard;8 0 the
type of "irreversible" shift in control represented by a dual class
transaction might well merit similar treatment.8 " The Revlon princi-
ple may also reduce the extent to which even already recapitalized
firms are insulated from the market for corporate control by requir-
ing authorized but unissued supervoting stock to be sold to a puta-
tive bidder for the company in order to dilute the power of the
controlling bloc and permit competitive bidding for the inferior vot-
ing shares at a premium.
8 2
In any event, systematically equating dual class common stock
with defensive takeover tactics seems a mistake. One indication of
this error, among others, is that evidence on the wealth effects of
recapitalization proposals does not seem to be consistent with the
results of empirical studies on the proposal by management of a
structural takeover defense. 3 Recognizing that recapitalizing firms
77 See, e.g., R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISrTIONs 27-42
(Supp. 1989) (surveying the most recent evidence and concluding that "displacement
of inefficient management, whether inefficient in comparison to other firms in the
industry or inefficient in responding to changes confronting their entire industry, is a
quantitatively important motivation for acquisitions").
78 See, e.g., Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining issuance without stockholder vote of supervoting
preferred stock which would have made acquisition of Richardson-Vicks by Unilever
impossible without the consent of the Richardson family).
79 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
80 See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, 682 F. Supp. 772, 780-
82 (D. Del. 1988) (defensive recapitalization shifting control to management
constituted not merely sale of control, but an actual Revlon sale).
81 See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Conniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn.
1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that for a
recapitalization to trigger Revlon, the shift in control must be irreversible).
82 See M. LIPTON, J. FOGELSON, A. BROWNSTEIN & C. WASSERMAN, supra note 44,
at 113. Such a theory has never been tested in court, but it has influenced actual
events. Merv Griffin, for instance, forced Donald Trump to negotiate with him in
their fight for Resorts International by suggesting to the Resorts board that it sell
Griffin enough unissued supervoting shares to bring Trump-who held all
outstanding supervoting shares-below the control level so that Griffin could offer a
premium for the inferior voting shares. See id.
83 Compare infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (pointing out that at worst,
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historically constitute a minuscule fraction of all public firms, 84 and
that a high level of hostile merger and acquisition activity existed for
years long before the arrival of Rule 19c-4, reports of the death of
the market for corporate control in a worid of legal recapitalizations
would appear premature. As the Justice Department's Antitrust
Division pointed out to the SEC in a December 1986 letter, several
firms with dual class capital structures in fact have been acquired.85
The ability of shareholders to receive much of a control pre-
mium for their shares in the sample recapitalizing firms also remains
an open question. The historical probability of an unfriendly, pre-
recapitalization takeover bid seems very low.86 Additionally, even if
such an offer were launched, little room exists for a premium of any
appreciable magnitude.87 Together, the low probability of a take-
over bid and the small magnitude of any rational premium offered
therein suggest that any expected premium would likely be minimal,
even if a single class of stock were retained. Further, the idea that
some expectancy of pecuniary gain is being taken away from share-
holders by the recapitalization itself is another concern more appeal-
ing in theory than in reality. DeAngelo and DeAngelo specifically
studied acquisitions of already recapitalized firms and found that in
20 out of 30 cases both stock classes seemed to receive comparable
compensation.
88
recapitalizations result in average share price decrease of .82% to .93%o) with J.
COPELAND &J.F. WESTON, supra note 54, at 741 (finding average price decreases of
2.33% for firms announcing structural takeover defense plans over the 1968-1983
period (cidng L. Dann & H. DeAngelo, Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate
Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure
(December 1985) (manuscript))); .ee also Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation
of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 149-51 (1987) (disputing that
recapitalizations may be equated with defensive tactics against takeover threats in a
general sense).
84 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
85 See Ferrara, Carroll & Dozier, Tender Offers: Toughing It Out, in MERGERS AND
AcQUlSITIONS IN THE 1980s: ATrCkcK AND SURVIVAL 285-86 (R. Ferrara ed. 1987).
86 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88 See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 69, at 57.
Of course, the fact that fully voting stock generally trades at some premium
relative to inferior voting stock indicates that the insider group possesses some sort of
realizable value that outsiders do riot. Yet this fact alone says nothing about whether
the recapitalization transfers wealth to the control group at the expense of public
shareholders. As Professor Gordon recognizes, the differential likely reflects the pre-
existing control premium of the insider bloc as well as any wealth transfer to that bloc
pursuant to the recapitalization. Since the exact value of that premium is not known,
one cannot necessarily conclude that the recapitalization transfers wealth to the
insiders. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 32 n.99.
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There is yet another twist of irony in the Commission's
approach in this area. Despite the SEC's professed concern with the
defensive use of dual class transactions, the Commission nonetheless
specifically exempted from the reach of Rule 19c-4 the two most
effective antitakeover tactics in existence today-the poison pill8 9
and the corporation's strategic defensive use of control-share acqui-
sition statutes.9" These exemptions smack of sunshine patriotism.
The SEC's stand against defensive tactics seems to go no farther
than its ability to toss around the warm slogan of "one share, one
vote," without actually resorting to a principled rejection of defen-
sive tactics. Nor can the Commission justify such unequal treatment
on the grounds of federalism, since state law permits poison pills as
well as dual class recapitalizations. 9' Something else, beyond princi-
pled concern for the vitality of the corporate takeover market,
appears to have been at work behind the equal voting rights goals of
Rule 19c-4.
C. Fiduciary Duties
In a final justification for its one share, one vote rule, the SEC
claims in the Release that recapitalization plans are not subject to
state law fiduciary duty inquiries. 92 Contrary to the Commission's
suggestion, though, fiduciary standards historically have had a defi-
nite role in disparate voting rights transactions. Dual class common
stock transactions, including recapitalizations, in fact have been
reviewed by courts under state law fiduciary duty requirements.
93
Recapitalizations involving supervoting preferred stock have been
89 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,225-26.
90 See 17 C.F.R. 240.19c-4(d)(4) (1989); Release, supra note 3, at 89,225.
91 See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
92 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216 ("The Commission believes that it is
preferable for a company's insiders wishing to gain voting control to do so through a
repurchase of shares in which such repurchase is subject to . . . judicial review
regarding state corporate fiduciary requirements.").
93 See, e.g., Barris Indus. v. Bryan, 686 F. Supp. 125, 133 (E.D. Va. 1988); Baron
v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Kahn v. Schiff, 105
F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D. Ohio 1952); Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d
121 (Del. 1977); Williams v. Geier, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,283 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1987); Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271,
278-79 (Del. Ch. 1986); General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J.
Eq. 234, 100 A. 347, 349-51 (NJ. Ch. 1917).
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similarly scrutinized,94 as have "reverse" recapitalizations in which
the firm goes from two classes of common stock to one class.
95
The standard of review emerging at the time of Rule 19c-4's
making certainly was not a toothless one. In Lacos Land Co. v. Arden
Group, Inc.,96 Chancellor Allen strongly indicated that the Delaware
courts would begin reviewing recapitalization transactions under the
stringent "entire fairness" standard.97 Although Lacos Land did not
reach the "fair price" merits of the dual class transaction at issue
there,9" the brandishment of Weinberger seems a clear signal that judi-
cial reviews of recapitalizations on the merits would have been fertile
territory for dissenting shareholder-plaintiffs had not Rule 19c-4
mooted the issue. In fact, at least one court actually seems to have
applied a test substantially similar to the Weinberger "fair price" stan-
dard decades ago.99
Other courts have applied deferential standards in the past.
00
However, at least with respect to the types of recapitalizations with
which the SEC is most concerned, such deference lacks firm histori-
cal roots. In General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel, '01 one of the
early leading cases on dual class stock, the corporation was to sell
Class B nonvoting stock to the public at large. The court was not
hostile to the offering, finding that it fit squarely within the then-
operable NewJersey corporate statute governing common stock vot-
94 See, e.g., City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mann, No. 84-4010 (D.NJ. Aug. 2,
1985), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1986); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-
Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Asarco Inc. v. Holmes A Court,
611 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D.NJ. 1985).
95 See, e.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 413-26, 165
A.2d 741, 748-56 (Del. Ch. 1960).
96 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986).
97 Lacos Land involved an exchange offer recapitalization and held that the
principal shareholder and chief executive officer who proposed the plan had "a duty
to act with complete loyalty to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders."
Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 278 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983)). The "entire fairness" test of Weinberger requires a challenged transaction to
meet the requirements of both "fair dealing and fair price." See infra note 248.
98 The transaction ran afoul of Weinberger's "fair dealing" prong due to threats in
the recapitalization proxy statement. See Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 278-81.
99 See Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (S.D. Ohio 1952) (enjoining an
exchange offer recapitalization; even if procedural fairness had existed, the plan
wrongfully would have exchanged superior voting control shares destined for
management for existing shares at a ratio, or price, well below their actual value).
100 See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 692-97 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (appearing to apply mere duty of care review).
101 87 NJ. Eq. 234, 100 A. 347 (N.J. Ch. 1917)
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ing rights." 2 Nonetheless, the court warned that a genuine dual
class recapitalization-as opposed to the public offering at issue in
the case-would have met with a more demanding judicial recep-
tion. 103 Seventy years later, Lacos Land provided a good example of
what such a reception would look like.
The SEC's fiduciary duty claim also does not take into account
the "sale of control" fiduciary standards likely to be applicable when-
ever agency costs are a credible concern. It has been held in different
contexts that recapitalizations shifting control to management con-
stitute a sale of control,'0 4 and courts regularly disallow sale or
transfer of control when the percentage of equity underlying that
control becomes sufficiently low.'0 5 The sensible economic rationale
implicit in these decisions is that when equity ownership falls below a
certain point, the controlling entity is immune to the wealth effects of
its own decisions. There seems no apparent reason why this body of
law would not be effective in combatting the Commission's oft-
repeated fear of recapitalizations vesting control of the firm in per-
sons with a tiny equity investment.
102 See Bethlehem Stee4 87 N.J. Eq. at 246-50, 100 A. at 348-51. The SEC also
exempted both initial and subsequent public offerings of lower voting stock from the
effects test of Rule 19c-4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)(I)-(2) (1989).
103 The exact language employed by the court is of particular interest since it
addresses an alteration of the voting rights of existing shareholders by those with a
small equity interest in the firm-both major concerns of the SEC in the Release:
The question [here] is not, however, whether, after a person has
purchased stock in a corporation having a certain amount of stock vested
with the right to vote, these fellow stockholders may voluntarily separate
the right of property from the right to vote, and thus put the control of
the corporation in the hands of those having no pecuniary interest therein
and deprive the dissenting stockholder of the advice and action of those
whose advice and action he may have fairly be said to have contracted for,
but rather whether such stockholder is entitled to require that any new
stock issued should be vested with the privilege of voting-a very different
proposition.
Bethlehem Steel, 87 N.J. Eq. at 237, 100 A. at 349.
104 See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, 682 F. Supp. 772 (D.
Del. 1988) (defensive recapitalization plan provided for dividend which only
management and the firm's ESOP would receive in stock; shifting of control to
management by increasing the equity share of management and the ESOP from
7.4%o to 55% found to be a "sale of control").
105 See, e.g., Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964),
aff'd 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (disallowing transfer
of control that came with a mere 3% equity holding originally belonging to Roy
Cohn). Conversely, courts allow the consummation of control appurtenant to a bloc
of equity when the amount of equity is, coincidentally, in the healthy range typical of
recapitalizing firms. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397
N.E.2d 387 (1979) (44.47o equity bloc).
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It also bears mention that the aftermath of a recapitalization
does not give the management control bloc carte blanche to damage
the remaining, voteless, shareholders. Controlling management
stockholders have a long-recognized general heightened fiduciary
duty imposed upon them to behave with the utmost integrity.'
Such duties undoubtedly are further sharpened where, as seems
ordinary in the sample recapitalizing firms, the family-management
bloc actively involves itself in the selection of firm directors.
10 7
Additionally, these general protections are buttressed to some
degree by specific legal protections for nonvoting shareholders.
10 8
II. THE CORPORATION AS CONTRACT, NOT NATION-STATE
What accounts for the SEC's embellishment of both the circum-
stances in which dual class plans are adopted by shareholders and
the consequences of such plans? The most likely answer is that the
Commission views the corporate vote as a moral right, a view shared
by other one share, one vote advocates. Yet moral-political concerns
are inappropriate with respect to the relationship between corpora-
tion and shareholders, and the failure of the Commission to notice
or accept the distinction has obfuscated the proper role of govern-
ment in the area of shareholder voting rights and sent the SEC down
the wrong regulatory path. Because the corporate vote is conceived
of as sacrosanct by the Commission, it is quite naturally-though
incorrectly-presupposed ,that a shareholder would never actually
want to transfer it. The New England town meeting view of the cor-
poration that forms the real. basis for one share, one vote efforts such
as Rule 19c-4 contains no conceptual limiting principle and mis-
perceives the deliberate, contractarian nature of many recapitaliza-
tion transactions. Indeed, historically typical recapitalizations often
106 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947)
(shareholder in control of firm's Class B voting shares, and who dominated the
directors, management, and affairs of the firm, held to rigorous fiduciary standard
and required to prove the "inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation"
of a decision to redeem the limited voting Class A shares); see also Berle, Non-Voting
Stock and "Bankers' Control," 39 HARv. L. REv. 673, 677-79, 682-90 (1926) (reviewing
the aspects of older case law suggesting that control of a corporation by management
shareholders results in "rendering them analogous to trustees, imposing many of the
duties which trustees normally have toward their cestuis que trust").
107 See supra note 71.
108 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (1983) (providing that a class of
shareholders may vote as a class on any charter amendment which would alter the
rights or powers of such class adversely, whether or not the class is otherwise entitled
to vote); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 804 (McKinney 1986) (same).
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seem to represent a rational and legitimate use of the contracting
process to amend the firm's articles of incorporation: corporate
votes are shifted to their highest use value-the family-insider bloc-
and overall utility is maximized as a result.
A. The Moral-Political Basis of One Share, One Vote
In the 1920s, Professor Ripley set the mold for the view of dual
class common stock as a moral threat to democratic ideals. The
problem of shareholder voting rights, Ripley wrote, "is a question of
devising something as respects the management of property analo-
gous to the system which the fathers of the American constitution
sought to introduce into our scheme of political government."109
Ripley's plea has been heeded since in powerful quarters. Over the
ensuing decades, the SEC has persisted in seeing the public corpora-
tion as an entity that derives moral legitimacy from the voting partici-
pation of average shareholders,"'10 in the same way that nations gain
such legitimacy from the voting participation of their citizens.
Under this banner virtually every conceivable aspect of the proxy
voting process has been investigated and regulated by the Commis-
sion, either directly or indirectly, all with a view towards creating
true shareholder democracy. 11' So comprehensive has been the
effort, so painstaking in its requirements, that as Professor Louis
109 W. RIPLEY, supra note 14, at 130.
110 A mystical, natural-law view of the corporate vote never seems to be far
beneath the surface in any SEC discussion of the subject. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND
EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. 65-68
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT] (after admitting that weight of
evidence is to the contrary, insisting nonetheless that participation in corporate
electoral processes important to shareholders and should be increased); see also
Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 HARv. L. REV. 796, 797 & n.4 (1950)
(quoting SEC Annual Report as referring to the shareholder's "right of franchise")
(emphasis added).
There has never, in fact, really been a legal "right" to equal per share voting
power in the form of a law mandating such a right. Rather, the one share, one vote
capital structure must be understood as an investment custom, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text, the outcome of a consensual bargaining process between
investors and those seeking to raise capital. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text. The Commission for years has confused this private convention for a "right."
This is the root of the problem with the SEC's approach.
I I I See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 40 (E.S. Mason ed. 1960). A brief look at Rules 14a-1 to -12 and
Rule 14b-1 confirms the basic truth of this statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1989); id § 240.14a-1 to -12; id. § 240.14b-1.
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Loss once remarked, the West might never have been won had these
rules then been in effect." 
2
Predictably, the re-emergence of dual class stocks in the 1980s
has induced angst among those dedicated to the notion of the corpo-
ration as body politic. Serious observers have likened dual class
common stock to "apartheid as a system of corporate govern-
ance," "13 and termed the equal shareholder vote a "basic, immutable
right."" 4 Testimony before the SEC even predicted complete even-
tual removal from the capital markets of money by investors as a
result of disparate voting rights plans. 1 5 The sheer implausibility of
such an occurrence is a small but meaningful example of the emo-
tions engendered by the issue.
The SEC itself was propelled by this type of passion, as well as
the internal logic of its own institutional history, in making Rule 19c-
4. At the initial stage of the debate, for instance, three of the five
Commissioners expressed the view that "if shareholders were willing
to give up their voting rights, it was their privilege to do just
that.""' Yet in an apparent regulatory volteface, the SEC in the
Release justifies the need for Rule 19c-4 in the moral lexicon of the
corporation as polity. "17 Moral faith to the point of naked mysticism
can be seen in the Commission's brief insistence, without any proof
whatsoever, that "[s]hareholders who purchase voting shares in a
company do so with the understanding that the shares will be accom-
panied by the voting rights attendant to the stock at the time of
purchase."",18
True, the SEC spends i:he bulk of the Releaseformally justifying
Rule 19c-4 on more earthly utilitarian grounds, claiming Rule 19c-4
112 See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 122 (2d ed. 1961).
11S See Kirk, Disparate Voting Requires Study, NASD Decides, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23,
1985 (quoting the remarks of one practitioner concerning the dual class
recapitalization trend).
114 See Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1006.
115 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,211.
116 See Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 984 (citation omitted).
117 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,215 ("A. Need for Rule 19c-4. . . . The
Commission continues to believe that the issue of shareholder voting rights has far-
reaching implications, and that a rule ensuring a minimum level of shareholder
protection from disenfranchising actions is appropriate and consistent with the
purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 1934].") (emphasis added); see also
Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Shares - Their History, Legality,
and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. LJ. 165, 169 (1987) (acknowledging that proponents of
equal shareholder voting rights find something "morally objectionable" about
arrangements to the contrary).
118 Release, supra note 3, at 89,215. Evidence on shareholder expectations
invites the opposite conclusion. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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focuses only "on the process by which disparate voting plans are cre-
ated and their effect on existing shareholders." '119 The problem is
that if the first claim is true-that shareholders essentially have some
sort of immutable right forever to hold their shares in the identical
form originally purchased-the process by which that form might later
be changed should be irrelevant. And indeed, looking beneath the
rhetoric, it is. Observe that the actual thrust of Rule 19c-4 involves
effects, not process, 120 and that with a few narrow exceptions,
121 all
processes that create dual class stock are prohibited.
Process is in fact ultimately irrelevant in Rule 19c-4, and would
for that matter necessarily be irrelevant in any rule mandating equal
shareholder voting rights: even if the particular recapitalization at
hand were completely free from procedural (or even substantive) sin,
it would still be disallowed. That is simply the nature of a one share,
one vote rule. Of course, such an uncompromising approach would
be explicable without reference to moral values were dual class
transactions pervasively problematic. Yet as Part I discusses, this is
not the case; and still other facts indicate the moral-political basis of
Rule 19c-4. The entire concept of rational apathy seems to have
been imported from the field of political science.1 22 Most telling of
all, the inalienability protection represented by a one share, one vote
rule such as Rule 19c-4 is typically reserved by society for when a
moral value is at stake.121 On the whole, then, the Commission's
formal utilitarian rationales seem little more than respectable-sound-
ing expedients cloaking quite a different, moral, concern.
124
119 Release, supra note 3, at 89,218; see also supra notes 27-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the SEC's collective action, strategic choice, agency
cost, and fiduciary duty justifications for Rule 19c-4).
120 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
121 Rule 19c-4 lists three transactions that, while creating disparate voting
common stock, are presumed not to violate the basic effects test: (1) initial public
offerings; (2) subsequent public offerings of stock equal to or lower than existing
stock with respect to voting rights; and (3) issuances of equal or lower voting stock in
order to effect a "bona fide" merger or acquisition. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)
(1989).
122 See Romano, supra note 50, at 1607.
123 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1123-24.
124 And one that might just as easily be turned around and thrown back at the
Commission. Former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr. has chided that once we
cut through it all, the end result of Rule 19c-4 "smacks of Central American
'democracy': if you don't like the results of the election, stop having elections."
Sommer, supra note 41, at 3.
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B. The Moral-Political Viiw Versus the Contractual Nature of the Firm
1. General Principles
Moral concerns are, of course, relevant when the discussion is
one of political rights. The moral-political impetus behind the one
share, one vote movement, however, is fundamentally misguided
because the corporation is emphatically not a nation-state or body
politic in any meaningful sense. Albert Hirschman clarified the dis-
tinction between a citizen in a political democracy and a shareholder
when he pointed out that a shareholder-at least in a public corpora-
tion-possesses both an "exit" and a "voice" option." 5 That is, a
disgruntled shareholder can easily remove himself from the corpo-
rate "society" by selling his shares on the open market any time he
wishes.1 2 6 In contrast, a citizen of a body politic must depend on the
"voice" option alone since leaving the country and changing citizen-
ship is not a practical alternative. 127 Put somewhat more fundamen-
tally, the granting of moral content to shareholder democracy is
misconceived because shareholders are not "governed" in any pur-
poseful sense of the word by the corporation in which they have
invested.1 28 Morals-based regulations directed at corporate govern-
ance are, in this sense, an exercise in "make believe" based on false
premises.1 29 The same considerations also provide us with a sound
reason why for decades the law has permitted corporate voting rights
to be altered in a way that political voting rights cannot.
The difference between polity and corporation further reflects
itself in the formal instrument through which the individual relates
to the larger entity of which he is a part. While political philosophers
have used the vague notion of a "social contract" as an analytical
construct for centuries, shareholders have always had a very tangible,
detailed, and specific contract that governs the affairs of the corpora-
tion of which they are a part: the articles of incorporation. State
corporate law traditionally has viewed the articles of incorporation in
precisely this contractarian fashion."' The Supreme Court as well
125 See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
126 See id. at 20-28.
127 See id. at 32.
128 See Chayes, supra note I 1l, at 40.
129 See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ. 1477, 1489 (1958) (reviewingJ.A.
LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)).
130 See, e.g., Bowman v. Armour & Co., 17 Ill. 2d 43, 47, 160 N.E.2d 753, 755
(1959) (stating that articles act as contract both between shareholders and
corporation, and among shareholders themselves); see also R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON
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historically has taken the view of the articles of incorporation as a
contractual arrangement.13 1 Ever since Ronald Coase's classic work
on the subject, economists too have viewed the firm generally as a
nexus of contracts.
1 3 2
This contractarian view of the corporation has been particularly
conspicuous with regard to shareholder voting rights, which state
law for decades has held generally to be a matter for the involved
parties to arrange themselves. 133 A legal rule of one share, one vote
was also unknown at common law,' 3 4 as was generally any rule on
voting rights overriding that which the involved parties arranged
contractually.'3 5 This legacy continues in the corporate codes to the
present day, with statutes in the large majority of states permitting
voting rights to be restricted or otherwise altered by amendment to
the articles of incorporation.' 3 6 One share, one vote efforts such as
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 82, at 328 (1st ed. 1936) ("Membership in a
corporation is essentially the result of contract.").
'3' See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596 (1921)
(holding that corporate articles implied a contract among shareholders); Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 592 (1819) (finding that
corporate charter a contract for purposes of the contracts clause of the Constitution).
132 See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also Cheung,
The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1983).
133 See, e.g., General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, 241,
100 A. 347, 350 (N.J. Ch. 1917) (noting that "[tihe matter [of shareholder voting
rights] is one for the stockholders to determine by their contract"); People ix ret
Browne v. Koenig, 133 A.D. 756, 759, 118 N.Y.S. 136, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)
("[I]t is perfectly lawful for different classes of stockholders to agree amongst
themselves, through the certificate of incorporation, that one class shall have no vote
... and that such an agreement does not contravene public policy .... ); Miller v.
Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 158, 24 N.E. 496, 500 (1890) (noting that an articles
provision restricting voting rights is "but an arrangement between two classes of
stockholders which did not concern the public"); see also Kerbel, An Examination of
Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC.
REG. LJ. 37, 51 & n.40 (1987) (noting that traditional state law approach to
corporate voting rights has been one of freedom of contract and not a "public
policy" of one share, one vote).
l34 See Ratner, supra note 2, at 10 (finding that "there does not seem to have
been any" common law rule concerning corporate voting rights, and that if there
were such a rule, it probably was one shareholder, one vote).
135 See, e.g., Comment, Delaware Resurrects the Common Law: Affirmation of
Contractual Voting Restrictions Within a Class of Stock, 4 DEL.J. CORP. L. 154, 165 (1978)
(noting that in the history of the state of Delaware, for example, the "one share, one
vote concept... was specifically mandatory for only four years, after which the greater
flexibility of contractual voting arrangements was permitted").
136 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 501(a) (McKinney 1986).
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Rule 19c-4 directly contravene this traditional approach to corporate
voting rights.'
3 7
2. Implications of the Moral-Political View
The legitimate scope of and basis for government action in the
disparate voting rights area has been obfuscated precisely because of
the conventional wisdom's failure seriously to consider the con-
tractarian view of the firm, and its importation of a moral-political
view. In a general sense, the moral and political view of the share-
holder and his vote contains no limiting principle with respect to
government regulation of corporate actions. Problems such as col-
lective action and strategic choice are properly understood as "trans-
action costs" in the methodology of law and economics; that is,
factors present in a transaction that prevent the achievement of a
wealth maximizing outcome.' 38 Yet never once does the Commis-
sion discuss these transaction costs qua transaction costs in the
Release. Rather, these factors concern the SEC not with respect to
shareholder wealth maximization, but only with respect to the
achievement of true shareholder democracy.'
39
Every law and economics analyst knows that high transaction
costs such as those the Commission, Professor Gordon, and others
believe to exist in recapitalizations dictate the narrow and flexible
liability or "damages" rule form of legal protection.140 Yet because
the corporation is viewed in moral terms by one share, one vote
137 The types of recapitalizations disallowed by Rule 19c-4, for instance, have
been specifically upheld by state law courts. See, e.g., Providence & Worcester Co. v.
Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977) (upholding capped voting plan); Williams v.
Geier, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,283, at 96,408 (Del. Ch.
May 20, 1987) (dismissing challenge to length of time plan). Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recently affirmed state authority in this area. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("No principle of corporation law and practice
is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations,
including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders. ") (emphasis added).
138 This is the principle implicit in the famous Coase Theofem: "If there are
positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome may not occur under every legal rule.
In these circumstances, the preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effects
of transaction costs." A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13
(1983).
139 Compare Release, supra note 3, at 89,217 ("Ihe Commission does not
consider evidence on shareholder wealth effects to be critical to its conclusions.")
with id. ("[T]he Commission believes that the investor protection and shareholder
suffrage policies of the [1934] Act compel action in this area .... ) (emphasis added).
Hence, the Commission applied what could be called a "political" Coase Theorem.
140 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 & n.5 (3d ed. 1986); infra
notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
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advocates, these transaction cost factors are used instead to justify a
broad and inflexible inalienability form of legal protection, and, as a
result, given an ominous dimension they simply should not possess.
The application of a politicized Coase Theorem knows no limits.
It is a relatively simple matter to determine when an internal corpo-
rate transaction is efficient or inefficient; but there is no telling the
point at which it becomes "good" or "bad," just or unjust, by the
standards of Western democratic morality.141 The very philosophy
and chain of argument that produced Rule 19c-4 could for the most
part be applied to disallow virtually any shareholder vote in a large
public corporation whenever somebody with power and influence
decides that the proposal is "bad" for shareholders; or when the
SEC simply decides that such a ban is in the "public interest." This
is not hyperbole: clear signs that this internal logic is gaining
momentum can be seen in the most recent writings of Rule 19c-4's
prominent proponents.142 Indeed, while transaction cost rationales
are without a doubt profitable tools for economic analysis, such con-
cepts can be hazardous even when applied in the proper context.
The seductiveness of transaction cost analysis lies in its potential for
malleability. Scholars at times fall prey to a regrettable tendency to
begin by bandying about a few transaction cost hypotheticals, and
then to proceed without more to the claim of having "demonstrated"
the proposition they set out to prove. The hazard of course is that
what are at bottom normative desires of the decisionmaker or law-
giver are given the appearance of being true as between the actual
parties to a transaction. To take an example, consider that the exact
same freerider and rational apathy rationales used by the SEC to jus-
tify Rule 19c-4-a regulation which bans corporate vote transfers-
have also been used by another scholar to justify a diametrically
opposed theory of corporate vote selling.1
41
141 Cf Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE LJ. 223, 226 (1962) (protesting that "we have enough problems in the
corporate field without importing additional nettles from the democratic political
process").
142 In a recent article, Professor Gordon reiterates the same collective action
and strategic choice rationales originally developed in his dual class common stock
article and adopted by the SEC as justifications for Rule 19c-4. Yet now the apparent
target of inalienability regulation is not some particular shareholder vote but rather
shareholder votes in general: the new suggestion is that internal corporate legal
rules should be mandatory and unalterable by shareholder majority action. See
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1573-85
(1989).
143 See Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 776, 779-84,
789-90 (1979). Clark considers dual class transactions substantively comparable to
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In a more narrow sense, the moral and political view of the
shareholder and his vote leads to a misperception of what is really
going on in disparate voting rights transactions. The rational apathy
theory, for example, was developed by political scientists to explain
only why people do not vote in elections, not why they vote in a par-
ticular way. 14 4 Yet this is not the way the theory is used by the SEC
and Professor Gordon.' 45 Non-contextual misapplications of polit-
ical theory, of which the rational apathy example is typical, steer one
share, one vote supporters away from significant historical factors
regarding shareholder voting rights. Chief among these is that equal
voting rights have always existed in the vast majority of public corpo-
rations, even taking into consideration the recapitalization trends of
the 1920s and 1980s, long before Rule 19c-4 ever arrived.
141
Decades of contractual freedom allowed by state law to arrange vot-
ing rights in whatever manner the involved parties desired-in addi-
tion to the freedom any corporation enjoyed to list itself on the
AMEX or OTC markets, which before Rule 19c-4 always permitted
deviations from the one share, one vote principle' 47-never altered
the overall one share, one vote outcome of the process. As Easter-
brook and Fischel remark, large public corporations continue to con-
duct votes, often in addition to those required by law. 141 If even half
of the formal factors alluded to by the SEC in justifying Rule 19c-4
existed, corporate voting rights would have disappeared quite some
time ago. Yet this is not, historically, what has occurred.
Properly understood, corporate voting is but the product of a
his vote selling scheme. See id. at 803. Perhaps this explains why transaction costs
"have a well deserved bad name as a theoretical device . . . because there is a
suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified
transaction costs." Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233, 233 (1979) (quoting Stanley Fischer).
144 See Romano, supra note 50, at 1607.
145 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
146 As of 1985, only 170 of the nearly 5000 companies publicly traded on the
American Stock Exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) markets possessed dual class
capital structures. See Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 707 (1986).
Additionally, from 1962 to 1984, only 44 publicly traded firms on all markets created
a second class of limited voting stock. See Partch, supra note 10, at 313.
To be sure, there was an observable jump in dual class recapitalizations after the
NYSE moratorium: 29 in 1986 and 16 in 1985, compared to 10 in 1984. SeeJarrell &
Poulsen, supra note 66, at 135 (Table 1). Yet the number dropped sharply to 14 in
1987. See id. In any event, the addition of these numbers to the total number of firms
recapitalized as of 1985 does not change the fact that dual class firms constitute a tiny
fraction of all public firms.
147 See Kerbel, supra note 133, at 66.
148 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 398.
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contractual process in which common shareholders generally
demand, and receive, the vote as compensation for bearing the
residual risk of firm failure.149 The overwhelming and continued
historical existence of equal shareholder voting rights reflects the
outcome of just such a contractual process. Similarly, one might
expect that the extinguishment of the voting right in those compara-
tively few corporations in which this has occurred also often reflects
the outcome of a contractual process with a rational, underlying
purpose.
C. The Recapitalization as Contractual Arrangement
1. The Backdrop of the Typical Recapitalization
Although the transaction can take a variety of specific forms, 5 '
every dual class recapitalization at bottom involves the ultimate
transfer by an outside shareholder of his vote to the family-insider
bloc, which typically winds up with the superior voting shares. The
essential precondition of a legitimate transfer is that it be voluntary
and represent rational, economically based wishes. The conven-
tional analysis would claim that general, coercive collective action
and strategic choice problems refute the voluntary nature of such
transactions. Yet these objections are in the main embellished.'
Indeed, the background circumstances of the typical recapitalization
indicate that this precondition is met.
The most important reality to be acknowledged is that in the
large majority of circumstances, individual public shareholders sim-
ply do not care deeply about their votes. Most such shareholders are
in the game primarily for financial gain.'5 2 For this reason, many
149 See id. at 403.
150 One method is the "distribution," or "dividend" method, in which existing
shareholders receive, pro-rata, shares of new super or limited voting stock they vote
to create. Another method is the "voting rights alteration," or "length of time" plan,
in which shareholders approve a proposal transforming all shares held for a specified
time period by the same individual into supervoting shares. The final basic method is
the "exchange offer" recapitalization, which involves shareholder creation of a new
class of stock with different voting and dividend rights. Subsequently, each
shareholder has the opportunity, in a one time "exchange offer," to exchange
existing shares for shares of the new class. The exchange offer can itself be
structured in two different ways. In one variant, the new class created is the
supervoting class, which carries typically. a 10% lower dividend payment than the
inferior voting class. In another variant, the new class created is inferior in voting
rights but receives the higher dividend payments.
151 See supra notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
152 See A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 611 (3d rev. ed.
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have for some time likened the average individual shareholder in a
large public corporation to an essentially passive property owner not
unlike a bondholder. 1 -3 In fact, since the first skirmish over recapi-
talizations in the 1920s, the only people not protesting dual class
transactions appear to be the average shareholders themselves.
154
With all of the moral indignation over shareholder "disen-
franchisement," little attention has been paid to these simple reali-
ties. Mysticism, which ought not to have any role in the regulatory
process, is at times what the Commission offers in justification of
Rule 19c-4. Consider the SEC's bald insistence that shareholders
purchase shares with the expectation that the voting right attendant
to the stock at the time of purchase will always exist.15 It seems a
mistake to impute this expectation to shareholders, as the available
evidence suggests that public shareholders view stock purchases sim-
ply as investment rather than ownership decisions.' 5 6 The Commis-
sion's claim says more about its own normative expectations and
desires than it does about those of public shareholders. Probably
influenced by the parallel of "one man, one vote," conventional
commentators cannot seem even to speak of the fact that many of the
shareholders whom they perceive as downtrodden and oppressed
may actually want to divest themselves of the voting right-provided
that the circumstances are appropriate. Precisely because the agency
1934); J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 38 (1958) ("[S]tockholders, for
the most part, are... investors, who for the most part, do not wish to be bothered-
except by dividends."); Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 53-54 (E. Mason ed. 1960)
(pointing out that "[m]ost stockholders . . . are interested in their stock only as
investments"); see also Moneymen May Stop Deep-Sixing Proxies, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1989,
at 142 (noting that only about half of shareholders vote in any given proposal).
Significantly, at least one study by the SEC's own Division of Corporation Finance
invites the same conclusions. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 66 & n.5
("The majority of commentators expressed the view that shareholders have little
interest in participating in corporate governance-they are interested primarily in the
economic performance of their corporation.").
153 See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 416-17
(1986); Wood, The Status of Management Stockholders, 38 YALE LJ. 57, 59 (1928).
154 See W. RIPLEY, supra note 14, at 86-87 (lamenting that "the amazing thing is
that this final deathblow to the exercise of voting rights by the general public [i.e.,
dual class capital structures] has brought no voice of protest"); Wood, supra note
153, at 59-60 (suggesting that this "popular indifference" is precisely the result of
the fact that the average shareholder only considers himself a passive investor).
155 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
156 See Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate
Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 835-37 (study of
about 500 dispersed public shareholders revealed that over 90% viewed the decision
to purchase stock as an investment decision rather than an ownership decision).
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cost risks of the recapitalization are historically of a very low magni-
tude157 and the family-insider bloc typically is worthy of control,15
the general circumstances for a shift in control would seem often to
be correct from the point of view of shareholders.
On the demand side of the recapitalization, the critical analytical
principle is that the voting right, tends to follow those who bear the
greatest residual risk of firm failure. 59 The family-insider bloc typi-
cal of so many dual class transactions seems clearly to fit the bill.
Recall that this group usually possesses a very high percentage of
equity in the firm.' 60 This alone does not differentiate the insider
bloc from any other major shareholder, and would not alone make
legitimate a desire for outright voting control of the firm without
additional investment of some sort. What does legitimize such a
desire is the high percentage of personal wealth often invested in the
firm by this group,' 6 ' and the group's very significant investment in
the corporation of firm-specific human capital.' 62 No other share-
holder or group of shareholders could claim systematically such a risk-
bearing status. Significantly, the frequent presence of a high firm-
specific human capital investment by the family-insider group also
means that control of the firm has a private value to this group that it
does not have to the public.' 63 Again, the basic elements of a trade
would seem frequently to be present.
2. The Recapitalization Itself
The specific features of actual recapitalizations give further indi-
cation that such transactions often are borne of legitimate economic
motives. Virtually all recapitalizations involve some tangible collat-
157 See supra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text; infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
159 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 404.
160 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
162 Certain people sometimes possess an ability that is difficult to transfer and
which makes their involvement in a particular firm that much more valuable. Such
persons, therefore, require higher compensation in some form in return for this
"firm-specific" investment of human capital. See Fischel, supra note 83, at 137-38;
Williamson, supra note 143, at 244. Examples of such firm-specific human investment
include historical knowledge of customer relations and know-how in maneuvering in
a firm's culture. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 18 n.46. It requires no great leap in
faith to believe that firm-specific, human capital items, while ethereal in the most
contexts, are present when the firm at issue is a long-time family enterprise; this is
especially the case when the family members have invested much in the firm's equity.
163 See R. GILSON, supra note 77, at 112.
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eral transfer of wealth-either 10% or so higher dividend payments
or cash payouts-to the lower voting shares.'" 4 The most obvious
interpretation of this transfer is as compensation for the votes being
transferred to the superior voting shares. This would establish the
nature of the transaction as legitimate and potentially Pareto-opti-
mal. 165 Further, this interpretation is squarely in line with the his-
tory of dual class transactions 16 6 and is most sensible given the
general background circumstances of the recapitalization itself.'
67
According to the SEC and Professor Gordon, however, these wealth
transfers are not a compensatory mechanism but rather "sweeten-
ers" designed to coerce shareholders into giving up their voting
shares, another dimension of the asserted strategic choice prob-
lem. 168 Rather than cast aspersions on recapitalizations, however,
these arguments lend unintentional support to the legitimacy of
many such transactions.
Generally, strategic choice manipulation of the proxy proposal
in favor of the insider bloc is not possible where shareholder prefer-
ences are "single peaked," that is, where there is a true majority
preference. 169 Preferences are indeed often single peaked in public
corporations. 70 As if to confirm the point, Professor Gordon's own
raw data shows that in 12 of the 17 firms he sampled, the recapitali-
zation was approved by a majority of outside shareholders.' 71 No
cram down phenomenon is apparent from the data.
The most. significant problem with the sweetener argument,
however, is that its premise is incorrect in a way that highlights
164 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 79-85 (Appendix).
165 See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONoMIcs 440 (4th ed. 1982) (defining Pareto
optimality as that which makes someone better off without harming another).
166 During the recapitalization trend of the 1920s, the Harvard Business Review
commented that "[a] large group of investors is willing to exchange their voting
rights, inherent in all stock, for a steady and fixed rate of dividend and a supposed
lessening of the risk as contrasted with that of common stock." The Development of
Class A and Class B Stocks, 5 HARV. Bus. REV. 332, 334 (1927).
167 See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
168 See Release, supra note 3, at 89,216; Gordon, supra note 14, at 48-49. The
basic argument is that, because the insider bloc typically owns a large percentage of
shares, the sweetener is essentially a "cram down" vehicle designed to put the insider
bloc just over the top in obtaining passage of the recapitalization proposal. See id at
49. The additional claim that the amount of cash transferred in no way corresponds
to the actual value of the vote is intended to reinforce the basic argument. See id. at
58.
169 See Romano, supra note 50, at 1611.
170 See id at 1611-12. By insisting that public shareholders generally do not
favor recapitalizations, the SEC itself seems tacitly to accept the same proposition.
171 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 80-85 (Appendix).
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everything that is wrong with the SEC's philosophical approach in
Rule 19c-4. The basic one share, one vote argument presumes that,
because of the recapitalization's cram down context, shareholders do
not value their votes highly. 172 It is, in fact, true that the value of a
vote in a typical recapitalizing firm is negligible. Yet the myopic,
obsessive tendency to see every corporate event as public share-
holder oppression by the inside shareholders-in short, the moral-
political view of the corporation-causes the Commission and its
supporters incorrectly to presume why the vote is of negligible value.
In his work on the corporate voting right, Henry Manne pointed out
that the value of a vote in any given corporation is also inversely
related to the capital gains appreciation of the firm's underlying
equity and the efficiency of the firm's management. 171 Significantly,
the classic historical profile of recapitalizing firms includes high capi-
tal gains over the period preceding the transaction and highly effi-
cient, entrepreneurial manageient.174
It is primarily for these reasons, and not so much because of the
cram down potential, that the value of the vote is minimal. The dis-
tinction is substantively critical, establishing that the low public value
of the votes transferred frequently is quite properly traceable to gen-
uine, underlying economic factors-and not to coercive cram down
factors. Nor is such a conclusion surprising, for it comports neatly
with the background reality in many recapitalizing firms that the fam-
ily-insider group values control more highly than does the public.'
75
Hence the recapitalization more likely than not should be, in an ex
ante sense, voluntary and presumably wealth enhancing from the
point of view of public shareholders. These underlying structural
factors give good reason to believe that the contractarian process of
articles amendment frequently is being used rationally to shift voting
control of the firm to its highest use value-the family-insider group.
It also bears re-emphasis that the common law, a body of law usually
associated with a tendency towards efficiency and wealth maximiza-
tion, contained no contrary mandatory rule of one share, one
vote.1 76 The fact that a great many recapitalizations of all types
172 See J. CHOPER, supra note 30, at 563; supra note 168. As a result, the
sweetener is said to lure in just enough shareholders to put management over the top
and secure passage of the proposal.
173 See Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 CoLuM. L. REV. 1427,
1430 (1964).
174 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
1990] 1797
1798 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1761
increase shareholder wealth 177 lends empirical credence to such
propositions.
Other specific features of dual class recapitalizations help con-
firm the essentially contractarian nature of many such transactions.
Chief among these are the bonding mechanisms' 71 typically present
in such transactions. In all observed cases, the supervoting shares to
be held by management revert to normal voting shares whenever
transferred outside the family-insider bloc. Rather than representing
yet another evil dimension of such transactions, the transfer restric-
tions assure that only those who have a great deal of their own
money at risk in the firm and who have made the firm-specific,
human capital investment have the privilege of control. 17  The
agency cost effects of the recapitalization thus are kept to the lowest
possible level; the possibility of supervoting control being used to
extract control rents from the firm's cash flows rather than to
increase the value of the firm is greatly reduced by the transfer
restrictions.'80 This interpretation comports with empirical studies
indicating that the family-insider group's goal in the recapitalization
is increasing the firm's cash. flows, not the mere attainment of control
for its own sake.
l1 '
Additionally, once the recapitalization is taken seriously as a
potential contractual arrangement, the 10% dividend differential
itself can be seen in part as a bonding mechanism. The goal might
very well be to calm agency cost fears about the recapitalization, by
177 See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
178 Bonding costs or mechanisms are sums spent or things done by an agent-
here the management shareholder group-to reassure the principal-here the
outside shareholders-that no actions will be taken by the agent contrary to the
principal's interests. Hence they allow parties to negotiate at least partially around
any potential agency cost problem inherent in the relationship. See Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
179 Cf Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y. 2d 684, 685, 397 N.E. 387, 388
(1979) (noting that only "those who invest the capital necessary to acquire a
dominant position . . . in the corporation have the right of controlling the
corporation"). Significantly, the markets that in the 1920s created disparate voting
shares also created a mechanism that performed the identical function. The
supervoting shares were often held by the firm's investment bankers, who had a
substantial investment in the firm. See Berle, supra note 106, at 674 (1926). Moral
skeptics such as Professor Ripley tended to view this as some sort of social ill
demanding solution rather than the rational mechanism that it appears to have been.
180 Indeed, in one judicially reviewed recapitalization it appears that the family-
insider group openly put transfer restrictions into the plan precisely in an attempt to
ingratiate the plan with angered shareholders. See Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973,
975-76 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
181 See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 69, at 54-55.
ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE
promising continuing payouts of extra cash over the years and thus
systematically reducing the amount of cash that might otherwise find
its way into management's hands.182 This view of the dividend dif-
ferential as in part a bonding mechanism also provides a possible
answer to Professor Gordon's complaint that "[i]t would be an amaz-
ing coincidence if a tenfold increase in votes could be recompensed by
a 107 reduction in dividends."' 8 3 It would be even more amazing if,
as he claims, 184 the same 10%o dividend differential was precisely
what was needed in each and every recapitalization to just put the
insider bloc over the top in the proxy vote.
A more plausible interpretation is that the dividend differential
is in part a symbolic bonding cost, not necessarily, or fully, a precise
mathematical calculation of compensation; the real compensation for
the vote is, in addition to the remainder of this differential, the shift
in control of the firm to the group historically most able to deliver
high share appreciation values. 185 In Lacos Land, for example, the
inside shareholder who proposed the recapitalization had become
CEO of Arden in 1976. The company was at that time "in a desper-
ate condition," and its stock was trading at between $1 and $2 per
share.' 86 By the time the recapitalization was proposed less than ten
years later the stock was trading at about $25 per share,18 7 an
extraordinary appreciation. Though finding the particular transac-
tion in violation of the Weinberger fair dealing requirement due to cer-
tain threats in the proxy statement,' Chancellor Allen recognized
that the subjective motive in proposing the recapitalization itself was
probably legitimate and even "benevolent."' 9 The positive wealth
effects of many recapitalizations suggest that such anecdotes have an
empirical basis.1
90
182 Contrary to Professor Gordon's claim, then, the recapitalization does seem
to provide a real reason to reconsider the firm's payout policy. See Gordon, supra
note 14, at 48.
183 See id. at 58.
184 See supra note 168.
185 See Manne, supra note 173, at 1435 (noting that many shareholders prefer to
sell the vote but retain the underlying equity security and thus continue to enjoy
capital appreciation); supra note 74 and accompanying text (pointing out high pre-
transaction share value appreciation in recapitalizing firms).
186 See Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 274.
187 See id.
188 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
189 See Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 278.
190 See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
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III. THE LIABILITY RuLE MODEL: DISSENTER APPRAISAL RIGHTS
The moral-political basis of a one share, one vote regulation
such as Rule 19c-4 ultimately disallows virtually all types of recapital-
izations, regardless of merit. A regulatory model based on dissenter
appraisal rights, by contrast, proceeds from a proper identification of
the problem as one of contract rights and protects legitimate individ-
ual investor rights without being unduly burdensome to a majority of
shareholders favoring a recapitalization. Strong gains in efficiency as
well as doctrinal and philosophical coherence result. This more dis-
crete and narrowly tailored approach is, unlike that of Rule 19c-4,
able to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate recapitalizations; the
former are permitted to go forward and the latter are strongly
curbed. The model also provides an effective remedy to the
problems conventionally perceived in recapitalization transactions,
even assuming such problems to exist as stated by one share, one
vote advocates.
A. The Model: Theory and Philosophy
Since the recapitalization is potentially a simple modification of
the corporate contract and since no moral value is at stake in such a
transaction,"' the lawmaker's objective as a matter of theory ought
not be to void or disallow the contract but rather to assure that those
who dissented from it are not bound by its terms. Corporate law
already has developed an excellent vehicle for accomplishing this
goal: the dissenter appraisal remedy.
19 2
Indeed, long before the creation by state legislatures of statu-
tory appraisal rights, courts arrived at the same result simply by rea-
soning from the premise of the articles of incorporation as contract.
At common law, a single objecting shareholder could prevent the
consummation of a merger, sale of assets, or other fundamental cor-
porate change. 9 3 A majoritarian view eventually emerged, but one
consequence was that a dissenting shareholder in a fundamental
transaction involuntarily became a member of an organically differ-
ent corporation. Fortunately, state governments did not ban merger
transactions on the grounds that the dissenting shareholders would
be deprived of an immutable right to the corporate shares in their
191 See supra notes 125-90 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 25.
193 See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1453, 1453 (1966).
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original form. Rather, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to
see things, a dissenting shareholder had a legitimate contract claim:
He [the shareholder] may object that his co-corporators have no
power to make a new contract for him, and thereby constitute him a
member of a new and different corporation; for it is of the very
nature of a contract relation that it can be instituted only by the
real parties to it.
1 9 4
In the court's view, the appropriate remedy was the familiar rescis-
sionary damages rule of contract law. The corporation was ordered
to buy the dissenter's shares at their "value,"' 9' a value presumably
to be determined without reference to the unwanted merger.
19 6
Such an approach to dual class transactions is conceptually
appealing. The recapitalization would be permitted to go forward;
but a shareholder who does not wish to participate in such a funda-
mental change to the corporate structure would be monetarily
returned to the status quo ante at the expense of those favoring the
recapitalization. In the terminology of Calabresi and Melamed, the
appraisal scheme amounts to "liability rule" protection for the cor-
porate voting right: the right can be taken away by the majority of
shareholders, but only upon payment to the dissenters for their
shares of an objectively determined price.'
97
Because it approaches disparate voting rights transactions from
the proper contractarian premise, the appraisal rights model can be
expected to result in strong efficiency gains. The critical point is that
a great many recapitalizations that would be disallowed by an ina-
194 Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 46 (1858).
195 See Lauman, 30 Pa. at 49.
196 This is, in any event, the modem statutory approach to appraisal rights. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983) (providing that a dissenting shareholder
to be paid "fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of" the transaction itself); see also Gamey,
Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purpose, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 69, 70 (1980) (noting the movement of modem corporate law to the
position that the articles of incorporation "contract represents a right to receive
damages, in the form of cash appraisal, for its 'breach' ").
17 Calabresi and Melamed more fully describe the liability rule theory in this
fashion:
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to
pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a
liability rule. . . . [L]iability rules involve an additional stage of state
intervention: not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or
destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some organ
of the state rather than by the parties themselves.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092.
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lienability approach such as that of Rule 19c-4 likely would be, both
in theory and in fact, wealth enhancing. The theory has been
addressed."' 8 The empirical story is not dissimilar. The data on the
wealth effects of recapitalizations overall-that is, averaging all trans-
actions in a given sample--is somewhat unclear. A study by Megan
Partch concluded that "the evidence suggests that shareholder
wealth is not affected by the creation of a class of limited voting
stock." '199 Exchange offer recapitalizations involving dividend pref-
erences were found by Partch to have, on average, positive abnormal
wealth effects on the order of 2.76% around the announcement
period window.200 Other data paint a more negative overall picture,
but about the worst that can be found in any comprehensive study on
the subject is a relatively small average drop of .82% to .93% in
stock price upon announcement of the recapitalization proposal.20 '
The average-based numbers, though, are of limited usefulness
in evaluating any specific regulatory course of action. This is, after
all, the moral of the old joke about the statistician who had one leg in
boiling water and the other in liquid nitrogen and claimed: "On
average, I feel fine." What is beyond dispute is that a healthy per-
centage of the specific transactions studied are characterized by posi-
tive wealth effects. For example, Partch found that 44% of the
studied transactions had positive wealth effects around the
announcement period window. 20 2 When a dividend preference was
involved, 55% of the transactions were positive. 20 1 Similarly, Profes-
sor Gordon's study reports 58% of all transactions being positive;
when broken down accordinag to type, 75% of the exchange offers
198 See supra notes 150-90 and accompanying text.
199 See Partch, supra note 10, at 314.
200 See id. at 330. Professor Gordon undertook his own study of 19 NYSE firms
recapitalizing after the Exchange's moratorium. Yet he too found "no shareholder
wealth effects statistically different from zero for the sample as a whole." See Gordon,
supra note 14, at 28. Further, Gordon like Partch found positive abnormal wealth
effects for the exchange offer recapitalization on the order of 3.35%o around the
announcement period window.
201 See OCE UPDATE, supra note 45, at 1; see alsoJarrell & Poulsen, supra note 66,
at 149 (finding average negative price effects of.82%). This conclusion is not altered
even if the sample is broken down into sub-groups according to the type of
recapitalization undertaken. See id. at 148 (Table 8, Panel A). Professor Gordon's
study did find much larger, statistically significant negative numbers when the sample
was broken down in this fashion; but, as he acknowledges, his sub-sample sizes were
extremely small and these calculations therefore suspect. See Gordon, supra note 14,
at 28 n.75.
202 See Partch, supra note 10, at 330.
203 See id.
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had positive wealth effects, as did 40% of the length of time or "vot-
ing rights alteration" plans.
20 4
A flat one share, one vote diktat such as Rule 19c-4 would ban all
of these transactions. By contrast, a contractarian, compensation-
based model is more narrowly tailored and at least theoretically
avoids such overinclusiveness. Indeed, the great value of a liability
rule in the Calabresi and Melamed framework is that it is flexible.
The lawmaker is able to reach efficient results in a dispute despite
the presence of high transaction costs and bargaining barriers, and
the liability rule is thus well-suited for precisely such circum-
stances.20 5 The appraisal remedy also comports neatly with the
Coase Theorem and the conditions required for efficient interven-
tion in private economic affairs. 20 6 In utilitarian terms, the appraisal
remedy assures that the criterion of Pareto-efficiency is met: the
majority gets what it wants and the minority, because of the compen-
sation scheme, is not made worse off.20 7 Further, Calabresi and
Melamed liability rules are particularly appropriate from the effi-
ciency point of view where damages are easily calculable. 20 8 Such
rules therefore make sense in the recapitalization context.20 9
Whatever the administrative expense of an appraisal remedy might
be-and it is not being claimed here that such a remedy would come
free of charge210 -it likely would be more than offset by the effi-
ciency gains of permitting these many wealth enhancing transactions
to go forward.
The appraisal rights model also makes possible a more sensible
204 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 29 (Table 1, Study B).
205 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1119.
206 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. In fact, although there has been
some dispute on the matter, one of the most comprehensive historical studies of
appraisal rights statutes concludes that legislatures codified such remedies precisely
for the same efficiency reasons that motivated the courts. See Carney, supra note 196,
at 75 n.19; see also Note, The Right of Shareholders Dissenting From Corporate Combinations
to Demand Cash Payment for their Shares, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1132, 1143 (1959) (noting
that "appraisal statutes were enacted to accommodate the interest of the majority
shareholders in freedom to effect corporate combinations to that of the minority
shareholders in not being compelled to accept fundamental changes in the nature of
their investment").
208 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1120.
209 See infra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing recent simplification
under Delaware law of the traditional valuation method in appraisal proceedings).
210 Recent Delaware case law has, however, rendered the maintenance of an
appraisal claim far more economical than it has been in the past. Recent proposals
on appraisal rights drafted by the American Law Institute would, if adopted, push
this trend even farther. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal approach to federal regulation of internal corporate gov-
ernance matters, an area traditionally the province of state law. The
model is significantly less intrusive into the letter and spirit of state
law than the approach of Rule 19c-4.2 11 Some states already
expressly provide appraisal rights for articles amendments that
adversely affect the specified rights of shares, including the right to
vote.2 12 With respect to those states in which this is not the case, as
in Delaware, the dual class recapitalization nonetheless seems the
type of "fundamental" change in corporate control or nature for
which the appraisal right generally is available.21 3 Some state courts
even have held that although a particular transaction is not men-
tioned in the appraisal statutes, the appraisal remedy will still apply
where the transaction is in substance of the type provided for in the
statutes. 2 14 The proposed model also makes operable to the great-
est extent possible the appraisal laws of the state of incorporation.21 5
Even in the most unsympathetic scenario, then, the appraisal rights
scheme in no way wreaks tie havoc upon state corporate law inher-
ent in the SEC's conventional approach; an approach that would
affirmatively negate the letter and spirit of well-settled statutory and
decisional laws in virtually all states.21
As a matter of philosophy, the appraisal rights model is more
211 Although he did not file a dissenting opinion, SEC Commissioner Cox
publicly objected to Rule 19c-4 on the grounds that matters of shareholder suffrage
should remain within the domain of state law. See Bermant, supra note 39, at 9 n.2.
212 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. J.Aw § 806(b)(6) (McKinney 1986). This is also the
approach of the Revised Model Business Corporations Act. See REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACr § 13.02(a)(4) (1984).
213 All fifty states and the District of Columbia provide appraisal rights in case of
corporate merger or consolidation. See Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831-32 & n.II (1984).
Delaware also permits corporations to provide an appraisal remedy for any
desired transaction through the articles amendment process. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(c) (1983). Some scholars have argued, moreover, that appraisal rights for
fundamental transactions should be viewed as an implied contractual term in the
articles of incorporation. See, e.g., Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 878-881 (1983). Hence, requiring corporations to
provide an appraisal remedy as pa:rt of a dual class transaction would not be odious
from a strictly doctrinal point of view, even in Delaware.
214 See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25, 28-31 (1958)
(appraisal statute mentioned only merger or consolidation; even though transaction
characterized as sale of assets, court concluded that in substance it was a fundamental
corporate change of the type for which appraisal rights should exist). But see Hariton
v. Arco Electronics, 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962), aft'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963)
(rejecting such an approach).
215 See infra text accompanying note 220; infra notes 226-27 and accompanying
text.
216 See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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sensible than the Rule 19c-4 approach because it confines the pur-
pose and role of government to the actual interests of the particular
parties at hand; defined rights, not broad controls, govern events.
21 7
The baby is not thrown out with the bath water. The model contains
a very definite conceptual limiting principle because it tailors the
remedy to the damages actually suffered. Surely it cannot be a
proper role of government simply to ban any given type of commer-
cial transaction in which someone might be made worse off. If this is
to be the philosophical guidepost, then the markets might as well be
closed down completely; such would be the logical conclusion of a
philosophy that reduces group achievements to the lowest common
denominator.
2 18
B. The Model: Practical Format and Application
This section provides a blueprint of the workings and benefits of
the proposed appraisal rights model. 219 The model would require
lawmakers purporting to mandate a general one share, one vote rule
along the lines of Rule 19c-4 to exempt from such a mandate
any corporate action, provided that the corporation, in taking such
action, makes available to dissenting shareholders an appraisal
remedy in accordance with the otherwise applicable appraisal and
fiduciary laws of the state of incorporation notwithstanding any
such law which presumes to deny an appraisal remedy based upon
the listing of such class or classes of common stock on a national
securities exchange or market or the holding of the shares of such
class or classes of common stock by a defined number of
shareholders.
2 20
217 Cf R. POSNER, supra note 140, at 343 ("The choice is rarely between a free
market and public regulation. It is between two methods of public control-the
common law system of privately enforced rights and the administrative system of
direct public control-and should depend upon ... particular contexts.").
218 Cf Rohrlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 7 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 218, 226
n.46a (1933) ("It may possibly be argued that stockholders, like infants, should be
protected against their own acts, but if that is to become the guiding principle in
corporation law, in order to render it effective, the state must go very much further
than it has.").
219 The appraisal rights model is merely sketched with reference to Delaware
law. Delaware law is generally considered the least "friendly" to shareholders;
whatever efficacy the model possesses likely would not be reduced in other
jurisdictions.
220 Lawmakers might also consider suspending the SEC's Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and
14a-9 for proposed transactions that would, if consummated, violate a basic one
share, one vote principle. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (discussing
the role of Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and 14a-9 in causing problems of collective shareholder
action).
1990] 1805
1806 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1761
1. Basic Architecture of the Model
A corporation's board of directors has available to it a number
of state statutory enabling provisions that would allow it lawfully to
adopt and honor such a remedy.2 2 ' Significantly, once the corpora-
tion creates the appraisal remedy in order to qualify for the proposed
exception, the remedy's existence cannot be evaded. Shareholders
must be informed of the existence of the appraisal right.2 2 2 Further,
material information concerning the appraisal right must be dis-
closed to each shareholder, such as the proper means for perfecting
that right.2 23
While the model attempts to the greatest possible extent to
absorb individual state corporate laws, state statutes that deny the
appraisal remedy in the event that the stock is publicly traded or held
by a certain number of persons 2 24 would be rendered inoperative for
purposes of the proposed exception. One objective of the remedy is
to provide an ex post compensatory mechanism for a shareholder
who dissents from the transaction. If such a shareholder is correct in
his belief that the transaction is without merit, then ability to sell on
the market often would not be compensatory. Since the stock market
frequently can be expected to depress the price of the stock in the
event of a meritless transaction, the stock market exceptions to the
appraisal remedy would defeat the very purpose of the remedy.
2 25
The draft language also makes operable for purposes of the pro-
posed exception the "entire fairness" standard of Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. 226 and its progeny. Weinberger and its progeny govern the rela-
221 For example, the remedy could be characterized as a contract between the
corporation and its shareholders severally, conditional upon the shareholder lawfully
perfecting the appraisal right. See ])EL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(13) (1983) (providing
that every corporation shall have the power to make contracts); id. § 141(a)
(mandating that business and affairs of corporation to be managed by or under the
direction of the board of directors). The actual payout of cash, should things ever
come to that, could be characterized as a corporate repurchase of stock. See id.
§ 160(a) (stating that corporation may purchase its own shares); id. § 244(a)(2)
(providing that board by resolution may reduce corporation's capital by repurchasing
shares).
222 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. rit. 8, § 262(d) (1983).
223 See Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1356-57 (Del. 1987). Chief
among these means is the need to make a written demand for appraisal before the
proxy vote on the recapitalization is taken. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(l)-(2)
(1983).
224 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. lit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (1983).
225 See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 84 (1969); Schulman, Shareholder Rights in
Acquisition Transactions: A Dissent, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 1041, 1066-67 (1972).
226 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)_
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tionship between the appraisal remedy and entire fairness fiduciary
claims under Delaware law, and build into the model powerful
screening devices. Additionally, the absorbtion of Weinberger harmo-
nizes the model with evolving judicial developments at the state level
with respect to recapitalizations before Rule 19c-4 was handed
down.
2 27
2. How the Model Might Actually Work
The model creates three screens against illegitimate recapitaliza-
tions and their consequences, operative in three periods: (1) the ex
ante period before the recapitalization is proposed; (2) the period
after a recapitalization proposal up through the vote by shareholders
on the proposal; and (3) the ex post period after the recapitalization
is approved, should such a point be reached.
The model, in effect, would be triggered upon mere considera-
tion by management of a recapitalization proposal that would, but
for the model's suggested exception, violate a one share, one vote
rule. At this threshold stage, the model goes to work deterring bad
proposals in two ways. First, the Weinberger component of the model
establishes that a majority of outside shareholders and independent
directors would have to approve the proposal or else the transaction
eventually could face judicial scrutiny under the entire fairness stan-
dard, 2 8 with the burden of proof on the insider management
group.2 29 This aspect of the model is critical: any recapitalization
proposal ultimately would have to stand or fall solely on its own mer-
its, either with outside shareholders or with the courts. Any cram
down weaponry otherwise available to the insider group sooner or
227 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. As Professor Andre has
observed:
In retrospect, it seems likely that had the recapitalization trend continued
and the process and its effects become better understood, the courts
would have moved toward a standard allowing them to examine the merits
of recapitalization more closely. For example, the "fair dealing and fair
price" formula enunciated in Weinberger and its progeny would surely have
been elastic enough to permit the courts to separate the good deals from
the bad ones.
Andre, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 63 S. CALm. L. REv. 533, 633 (1990).
228 See infra notes 248-262 and accompanying text (describing scrutiny under
Weinberger and its progeny).
229 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. Further, the shareholder vote must be fully
informed and completely free from fraud, misrepresentation, and the like; otherwise,
even approval by a majority of outside shareholders would not save the transaction
from entire fairness scrutiny. See id. at 712.
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later would be neutralized. Second, the appraisal remedy dimension
of the model means that a marginal proposal that barely squeaks by
could nonetheless be expected to draw a large number of demands
for appraisal. Importantly, this constraint on management opportu-
nism exists whether or not the transaction would be able to pass
muster under the entire fairness test. The potential cash outflows of
such a consummated recapitalization 23 0 would be of substantial
significance.
23 1
Cognizant of these facts, a rational insider group would think
very hard indeed about even proposing a meritless transaction,
212
such as a recapitalization designed to protect a poorly performing
firm from the discipline of the market for corporate control. Signifi-
cantly, this deterrent effect is particularly strong precisely when
insider holdings are high enough to force a cram down of such a
dubious recapitalization. As major shareholders, members of the
insider group effectively would be paying the appraisal claims out of
their own pockets; and the sums paid out might be even higher if
damages are appropriate under Weinberger. These facts place a pre-
mium on careful ex ante consideration of the proposal by manage-
ment, with an eye towards how the transaction might later look to,
say, Chancellor Allen.
Should a recapitalization proposal actually be made, the model
would continue to work during the period in which the proposal is
considered by shareholders. Again, the critical factor is the applica-
bility of the Weinberger entire fairness and appraisal regime, which
hangs as a brooding omnipresence over the transaction. Consider
that the prisoner's dilemma objection to recapitalization proxy votes,
even if the basic tenets of the SEC's argument on the point were to
be accepted, would appear to be largely neutralized by the model. In
the exchange offer hypothetically adduced by the Commission,2 33 for
instance, the coercive element would be removed from the first stage
by the model's effective requirement that a majority of outside share-
230 See Partch, supra note 10, at 317.
231 Interestingly, under Delaware law, the impairment of capital restrictions
upon capital reductions may not apply in the context of appraisal payments. Hence,
management could not avoid actually making these payments by arguing that the
payments would impair the capital of the corporation, however factually accurate that
claim might be.
232 Cf Kanda & Levmore, Th Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32
UCLA L. REv. 429, 463-469 (1985) (contemplating the theoretical potential of
appraisal rights as a general monitoring tool against management which reduces the
ex ante costs of the agency relationship).
233 See supra text accompanying note 40.
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holders approve the plan. The appraisal right represents an effective
solution to the second stage-the decision to exchange or not after
the plan is approved-because the coercive fear of being left with
less valuable property is eliminated.23 4
The theorized rational apathy problem also would seem to be
diminished by the proposed model. Under the Weinberger regime,
fair price claims can be expected to collapse into appraisal claims for
the full value of shares. 23 5 As such, Weinberger portends that in the
future actual damages claims will revolve around fair dealing and dis-
closure issues. Put in more fundamental terms, successful claims for
damages under Weinberger likely will arise not so much because price
is too low, but rather because management does not disclose infor-
mation that speaks specifically to the fairness of the recapitalization
terms.216 Precisely the information Professor Gordon delights in
pointing out-such as the market price differentials between limited
voting and fully voting shares217-would have to be disclosed in
order to avoid liability. That which management discloses need not
be independently discovered by shareholders or at cost to them-
selves; and the $X figure in Gordon's rational apathy model238 would
as a result not be of sufficient magnitude to induce rational apathy
among shareholders.
A similar paradigm would apply under the model to the other
various strategic choice and game-playing theories adduced by the
SEC and Professor Gordon.23 9 If a shareholder truly opposes the
transaction, he need only demand appraisal, vote against the transac-
tion, and be bought out by the others at full pre-transaction value. If
the shareholder is correct that the transaction is a bad corporate
decision, and it is nonetheless approved, then he will gain and the
others will lose. If he is simply wrong about the wealth effects of the
recapitalization, then he lives with the decision. In no event would a
shareholder have to base his voting decision on the fear that, ulti-
mately, a vote against the proposal might result in an involuntary
transfer of wealth.
If after all of this the recapitalization proposal is approved, there
234 Cf Fischel, supra note 213, at 879 (arguing that appraisal right alleviates the
prisoner's dilemma in the conceptually similar case of a two-tier tender offer).
235 See Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses
Singer, 39 Bus. L. 1, 10 (1983); infra note 251 and accompanying text (noting that
fair price and appraisal valuation basically identical under Weinberger).
236 See Berger & Allingham, supra note 235, at 21.
237 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 32 n.99.
238 See supra note 49.
239 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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is a good chance that it is a legitimate, wealth-maximizing transac-
tion. After all, it likely will have been approved by a majority of
independent shareholders in circumstances essentially free from
coercion and pursuant to full disclosure. Moreover, dissenting
shareholders would be compensated by the majority. To object to
the consummation of a transaction in such circumstances would be
to object to two central premises of American corporation and secur-
ities law. 24 0 Such a view seems also to have been shared by the Jus-
tice Department's Antitrust Division, which in a December 1986
letter to the SEC stated that the NYSE proposal then outstanding-a
proposal that required a recapitalization to be approved by a major-
ity of independent directors and outside shareholders24 1 -would
adequately protect minority shareholders in recapitalizations.242
Nonetheless, if the transaction is not approved by a majority of
outside shareholders in circumstances free from sin, the model again
would provide a rather precise mechanism for setting things right.
Recent Delaware case law interpreting the Weinberger standard is of
particular importance. In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,243 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a shareholder may simultaneously pursue
both appraisal and Weinbergdr entire fairness claims in a single consoli-
dated action. 244 The Technicolor holding greatly minimizes collective
action problems in challenging a recapitalization under the proposed
model. The somewhat detailed procedures involved in demanding
appraisal, and the fact that less than all shareholders typically
240 See, e.g., R. GiLSON, supra note 77, at 109-10 (noting that from an efficiency
point of view, when some shareholders are interested in a vote's outcome for reasons
going beyond the value of their shares, traditional corporate law analysis requires
approval by a majority of disinterested shareholders in order to legitimize the
transaction); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2, at 7 (1985)
(noting that federal securities law traditionally has rejected regulation of the
underlying merits of a transaction, presuming instead that investors are adequately
protected if all aspects of the transaction are fully disclosed).
Depending upon how the remedy is drafted by the board, the model might
provide a vehicle for aborting a recapitalization even at this stage without a single
court paper being filed. Should the number of appraisal claims be high, the board
might consider calling off an approved recapitalization altogether. Cf DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251(d) (1983) (providing that any merger .agreement may contain a
provision entitling board to terminate a merger agreement even after shareholder
approval). In this sense the model might act as a de facto supermajority provision
applicable to recapitalizations, defeating any transaction even arguably without
merit.
241 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
242 See Ferrara, Carroll & Dozier, supra note 85, at 285-86.
243 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988).
244 See Technicolor, 542 A.2d at 1190-91. No "election" between the remedies is
required, although they must be pled in the alternative. See id. at 1191.
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demand appraisal when it is available, traditionally have rendered
class action devices problematic in such a context. Yet entire fair-
ness claims affect all shareholders in the same fashion, and by defini-
tion are easy to certify as class action proceedings. Because
Technicolor allows both types of claims to be coupled in a single pro-
ceeding, appraisal claims in essence will be able to "piggyback" on
entire fairness claims. As a result, the model in effect makes avail-
able the tremendous cost and efficiency benefits of class action pro-
ceedings even to appraisal claims. 245 Other aspects of the model
blend smoothly with the access given by Technicolor to such quasi-
class action appraisal proceedings,246 and recent proposals on
appraisal rights drafted by the American Law Institute-proposals
clearly reflecting and amplifying a trend at the state level to make
appraisal proceedings a realistic shareholder remedy-would if
adopted in the future even further reduce shareholder collective
action problems.247
What might a recapitalization challenge based upon the pro-
posed model look like? A dubious recapitalization secured by an
insider-group cram down would produce a strong entire fairness
claim.248 The fair dealing prong, as formulated by the Weinberger
court, would seem an effective weapon against precisely the type of
potential management chicanery that gives rise to coercive prisoner
245 Cf J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.1, at 722-
23 (1985) (describing the very purpose of class actions as the facilitation of bringing a
large number of small claims that, individually, would be difficult to maintain given
the relative costs involved).
246 Under the model, a shareholder would possess the right to acquire from the
corporation the number of shares for which an appraisal demand was made and the
right of access to shareholder lists. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (1983); id.
§ 220(b). The planning involved in bringing a class action suit would be greatly
facilitated by these rights.
247 Most notable among these proposals is a requirement that shareholders be
paid the fair value of their shares within 30 days of perfecting their appraisal rights.
The penalty to the corporation for not making such a quick payout is bearing the cost
of the entire subsequent judicial appraisal proceeding. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrITE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22(d) (Tent. Draft Apr. 16, 1990).
248 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained the "fair dealing" and "fair
price" components of the entire fairness standard:
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how
the approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained. The latter-
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of
the proposed [transaction], including all relevant factors .... All aspects
of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of
entire fairness.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
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dilemma, rational apathy, and strategic choice problems. Such
problems are, after all, largely coterminous with those circumstances
that the fair dealing test and the ultimate availability of an appraisal
remedy are effective in conbatting.
249
Other conventional objections to recapitalizations, such as Pro-
fessor Gordon's objection to the price aspect of such transactions,
25 0
seem squarely answered by the fair price and appraisal aspects of the
model. Under the Weinberger regime, fair price and valuation for
appraisal purposes are to be determined by "any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community.- 251 The language seems clearly to carve out a promi-
nent place in the analysis for modem discounted cash flow tech-
niques, and indeed the one reported post-Weinberger valuation case
portends the primacy of such techniques in valuing shares.252 The
market value of the shares on the day before the transaction proposal
is announced, a value previously of importance under Delaware
law, 253 seems no longer relevant. Hence, one of Professor Gordon's
important strategic choice criticisms and objections to appraisal rem-
edies-that management might time a transaction so as to coincide
with deliberately released good news about the firm and the inevita-
ble rise in share price caused by such news254 -seems rendered
superfluous by the model. Even if the market price of the stock were
considered relevant for valuation purposes, Professor Gordon's con-
cern is unwarranted because subsequent Delaware case law inter-
preting Weinberger establishes that purposeful management
manipulation of a transaction's timing is actionable under the entire
fairness standard.255
249 See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 168 & 183 and accompanying text.
251 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. Interpreting § 262(h) of the Delaware Code,
the court added further that appraisal value must be based upon "all relevant
factors." Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
"accomplishment or expectation" of the transaction are excluded. "Clearly, there is
a legislative intent to fully compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may be."
Id. at 713-14.
252 See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-46 (Del. 1989)
(Delaware Supreme Court affirming Vice-Chancellor's valuation, based upon
expert's discounted cash flow analysis).
253 See Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 281-82,. 194 A.2d 50, 53-
54 (1963).
254 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 32; Gordon, supra note 142, at 1587.
255 See Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105-07 (Del.
1985). Such a holding might also provide a legal basis to future courts for adopting
Professor Romano's suggestion that .the existence of managerially controllable
confounding events create a presumption of negative wealth effects, which
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Other aspects of the model present an effective solution to the
remaining standard objections to recapitalizations. Recall the SEC's
concern that such transactions deprive public shareholders of an
opportunity to share in a control premium for the firm. 56 While this
is an inflated claim with respect to the full history of dual class trans-
actions,257 there can be little doubt that at least some firms recapital-
izing in the period immediately preceding Rule 19c-4 did so for
defensive reasons borne of dubious intent. In the event that such a
transaction were approved despite the operability of the proposed
model, the insider group still would not be able to appropriate any
control premium under the model. Post-Weinberger case law
expressly prohibits consideration of any minority-share discount in
the valuation of shares and, by implication, forces a sharing of any
control premium with dissenting shareholders.
258
Professor Gordon recently has objected that appraisal remedies
based upon "intrinsic" value could be overcompensatory and deter
too many value-creating transactions by encouraging an inefficiently
large number of appraisal claims.259 This too is an objection obvi-
ated by the proposed model. One of the important holdings of Wein-
berger is the elimination of the old, cumbersome Delaware "block"
method of valuation 260 that attempted to derive intrinsic value as
defined by Gordon. In the post-Weinberger world, the objective of
Delaware appraisal proceedings is to give the shareholder the sub-
stantial equivalent in value to what he had before the transaction.
261
management would have to rebut. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1614. The fact that
this sort of management underhandedness implicates, at the least, Weinberger fair-
dealing values would also support such a legal theory.
256 See supra note 76.
257 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
258 See Cavalier Oil v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989). In the
court's view:
The application of a discount to a minority shareholder is contrary to the
requirement that the company be viewed as a "going concern." ... [To
fail to accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his
shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the
majority shareholders who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process
by 'cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.
Id at 1145. Cavalier Oil appears to adopt the now infamous rule on the sharing of
control premiums enunciated in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.
1955).
259 See Gordon, supra note 142, at 1587-88. By "intrinsic" value Gordon means
value based not upon market price or cash flow analysis, but rather upon net asset
value, liquidation value, and other underlying factors. See id. at 1587 n. 118.
260 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
261 See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985).
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In the terminology of contract law, this amounts to rescissionary, or
restitution, damages. Damages calculated in this fashion are pre-
cisely the correct prescription from an efficiency perspective if
opportunistic behavior is the concern, 2 6 2 as it is in Gordon's critique
of recapitalization and other management proposed transactions.
Further, even if appraisal remedies screen out some legitimate trans-
actions, they are certainly preferable to a general ban that prohibits
all such transactions.
CONCLUSION
In the 1930s, Berle and Means confidently declared in The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property that shareholder powerlessness was
the inevitable, necessary result of the separation of ownership and
control. The entire hullabaloo over shareholder democracy and dis-
enfranchisement, they implied, really was irrelevant: the only funda-
mental course of action would be social control of large public
corporations. Berle and Means have remained for five decades an
intellectual force to be reckoned with in no small part because they
bore the courage of their convictions. Many have disagreed with
them, but few question the power and consistency of their
arguments.
What of today's SEC? Easterbrook and Fischel offer an unflat-
tering comparison: "Berle and Means thought they had diagnosed a
fatal disease. They had no interest in the palliatives of the sort the
SEC has since adopted; they would have called them costly but
pointless." 2 63 The comparison is particularly apt with respect to the
one share, one vote issue. It is interesting to list briefly the thematic
contradictions and confusion present in the position of the Commis-
sion and other one share, one vote advocates- and to reflect on the
pointlessness of a flat one share, one vote rule even as measured by
the standards of these very advocates. The SEC and its supporters
proclaim that corporate democracy is of paramount importance; yet
the formal justifications offered for a one share, one vote regulation
turn on coercive factors claimed to be present in any shareholder
vote that would, if in fact present, serve only to show that corporate
democracy can never really exist. The SEC and its supporters pro-
claim the powerlessness and impotence of the individual shareholder
and his vote as another reason for prohibiting disparate voting rights
262 See R. POSNER, supra note 140, at 105-06.
263 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 397.
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transactions; yet they ask in the same breath that we accept preserva-
tion of this allegedly useless vote as a vital policy goal.
It has been said that the best method of confronting a false the-
ory is to take it literally, and this admonition is particularly relevant
in the case of Rule 19c-4. If the formal theories behind such a one
share, one vote rule are true-if it is true that collective action, stra-
tegic choice, and similar problems discredit the validity of share-
holder majority votes-then there is little point to having a rule
protecting shareholder voting rights to begin with. As if playing out
a role in some bad television sitcom, the SEC is like a doctor who,
claiming to have diagnosed a deadly ailment, tells the patient that a
nice bowl of chicken soup and a good night's sleep should clear up
the problem. At least Berle and Means had the fortitude to tell the
patient that the situation was hopeless and that funeral arrangements
would be in order.
Happily, though, both Berle and Means and the SEC misdiag-
nose the corporate patient. There is no fatal disease. Voting in large
corporations has been the overwhelming custom in the United States
and still continues to be. This Comment has endeavored to show
that, in those comparatively few corporations in which the voting
right has been extinguished, this outcome often can be explained in
terms of a rational contractarian process leading to wealth enhancing
transactions. Fixation upon an inappropriate moral-political view of
the corporation has blinded the SEC and its supporters to such facts
and steered the regulatory process in the wrong direction. Not the
slightest curiosity has been expressed that, historically, only a small
number of firms - most with strikingly similar characteristics militat-
ing strongly against the potential dangers of inferior voting common
stock - in fact undergo recapitalizations. Nor has it been recog-
nized that, as with other problems for which the national regulatory
impulse has been irresistible, a system of private rights perfectly
capable of dealing with the remaining dangers was evolving at the
state level from traditional common law doctrines. The unfortunate
result of such thinking has been-and could easily be again-a rule
that bans virtually all recapitalizations regardless of the legitimacy of
many, perhaps most, such transactions.
Professor Gordon voices his concern that "[e]ven if 'shareholder
democracy' is more illusory than real," we must assure that "high
corporate office is earned and retained on the sufferance of market-
place scrutiny." '264 A legal regime based upon the contractarian
264 Gordon, supra note 14, at 78.
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remedy of appraisal rights, that works with the marketplace rather
than struggling upstream against it, renders Gordon's concern itself
more illusory than real.
